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DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF NLRB
REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS
STEPHEN

B.

GOLDBERGT

INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Board performs two separate and dissimilar functions under the National Labor Relations Act.1 Under section 10 of the act, the Board is charged with the task of deciding whether
particular conduct violates the unfair labor practice prohibitions contained in section 8 of the act. The Board's procedures under section 10,
which begin with the filing of a charge alleging that an unfair labor
practice has been committed, and proceed through the issuance of a
formal complaint, answer, hearing before a trial examiner, and a proposed decision and order by the examiner, culminate in a decision by the
Board as to whether the person complained against has engaged in any
unfair labor practices. If the Board finds that any person named in the
complaint has engaged in an unfair labor practice, it is directed by section
10 (c) to state its findings of fact and issue an order requiring such person
to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the act. Conversely, if
the Board finds that no unfair labor practice has been committed, it
is directed to state its findings of fact and issue an order dismissing the
complaint. In either event, the Board's decision and order is subject
to judicial review in the appropriate United States Court of Appeals.
Section 10 (e) provides that the Board may file a petition for enforcement
of its order and section 10(f) provides that any person aggrieved may
file a petition requesting that the Board's order be modified or set aside.
It has long been settled that, save in extraordinary circumstances, the
foregoing judicial review procedure is exclusive, and precludes review
of unfair labor practice proceedings in the federal district courts.2
The Board's other function is that of administering the representat Associate Professor, Univ. of Illinois College of Law.
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
2. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); see Derring-Milliken,

Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
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tion provisions of section 9. Section 9(a) provides that a representative
selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in the
unit. Section 9(b) authorizes the Board to determine the "appropriate"
unit and section 9 (c) prescribes a procedure for determining whether the
majority of the employees in that unit wish union representation. Under
section 9(c), when a union files a petition with the Board, alleging that
a substantial number of employees wish it to be their representative and
that the employer declines to recognize that union, the Board is directed
to investigate the petition. If, after investigation and hearing, the Board
finds that a question of representation exists, it is to direct an election
by secret ballot (in the unit found "appropriate") and to "certify" the
results of the election, i.e., to inform all parties to the election whether
or not the union has been selected as bargaining representative by a
majority of the voters. If a majority of employees have chosen union
representation, it is the employer's obligation, under section 8(a) (5) to
bargain collectively with the chosen representative.
In contrast to section 10, which contains explicit provision, in paragraphs (e) and (f), for direct judicial review of Board orders issued
under that section, there is no provision in section 9 for direct review
of Board orders directing elections or certifying the results thereof.
Section 9 does, however, provide for indirect review of the certification
of election results. Thus, section 9(d) provides:
Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section
10 (c) is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following
an investigation pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and
there is a petition for the enforcement or review of such order,
such certification and the record of such investigation shall be
included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed
under section 10(e) or 10(f), and thereupon the decree of the
court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part
the order of the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript.
In other words, if a decision of the Board in a section 10 unfair
labor practice proceeding rests on the propriety of a decision made by
the Board in a section 9 representation proceeding, the latter decision
is subject to review by the court of appeals before which a petition to
review or enforce the Board's unfair labor practice decision is pending.
As a practical matter, the procedure normally works in the following
manner: An employer who believes the Board to have erred at some
point in the representation proceedings, e.g., by directing an election in an
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inappropriate unit, will refuse to bargain with the union that the Board
certified as having obtained a majority of the ballots cast in that election.
The union involved will then file charges under section 10(b), alleging
that the employer is violating section 8(a) (5) by refusing "to bargain
collectively with the representative of his employees" as determined by
the Board in the section 9 proceeeding. The Board's General Counsel
will then issue a complaint, and, after following the procedures set out
in section 10(b) and (c), the Board will issue a decision rejecting the
employer's defense that the Board erred in the section 9 proceeding,
finding him to have violated section 8(a) (5), and ordering him to
3
bargain with the union that prevailed in that election.
It is at this point that the provision for judicial review of the
Board's certification becomes meaningful. The Board's order directing
the employer to bargain is "based ...

upon facts certified following an

investigation pursuant to [section 9(c)]," i.e., the fact that the union
represents a majority of employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining.
Hence, review of that order under section 10(e) or (f) will encompass
the question whether the Board's underlying representation decision was
sound.4 Only if the reviewing court acquiesces in that underlying representation decision will it enforce the Board's order directing the employer to bargain.
Since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board
has taken the position that the indirect review of its representation
decisions obtainable through section 9(d) and 10(e) and (f) is exclusive
-that there is no provision in the NLRA for direct review, either in
the courts of appeals or in the district courts. Thus, the Board has asserted that the NLRA not only limits the statutory review procedure to
that described above, but also deprives the district courts of any power
they might otherwise have under a general jurisdictional grant to entertain actions to review and set aside erroneous Board decisions.'
3. The question whether to issue a complaint, albeit discretionary with the General
Counsel, will, absent extraordinary circumstances, be resolved in the affirmative, since the
employer's defense to the unfair labor practice charge will be that the prior Board representation decision was invalid, and the General Council normally regards himself as bound,
in an unfair labor practice case, to follow a Board decision in a related representation
proceeding. Letter from Arnold Ordman, General Counsel, NLRB, to the author, April
26, 1967. Similarly, absent a showing that the complaining party has newly-discovered
evidence to present, the Board will not reconsider in a refusal-to-bargain proceeding, the
merits of questions that were, or might have been, decided in a prior representation proceeding. NLRB v. Air Control Prods., 335 F.2d 245, 250-52 (5th Cir. 1964); United
Dairies, Inc., 144 NLRB 153, 154-55 (1963). Hence, the issuance of a complaint by the General Counsel and a bargaining order by the Board are pretty much a foregone conclusion
once the union files a refusal to bargain charge.
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. Air Control Prods., supra note 3.
5. District court jurisdiction of such actions is generally sought to be predicated on
28 U.S.C. 1337 (1964), which provides that: '"The district courts shall have original
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As has been noted, the exclusivity of the statutory procedure for the
review of unfair labor practice decisions was early settled. This was not,
however, the case as to representation decisions. To the contrary, both
employers and unions (and occasionally employees) have long argued that
Congress could hardly have intended that a procedure as cumbersome and
unsatisfactory as the foregoing be exclusive. Employers seeking to enjoin
the Board from conducting allegedly invalid representation elections have
asserted that Congress surely would not have required them to undergo
the expense and turmoil of an election, as well as the delay inherent in
litigation before a trial examiner and the Board, as a condition precedent
to obtaining judicial review of a plainly illegal Board decision. Similarly, unions that have been defeated in representation elections claimed
to have been erroneously directed by the Board have argued that the
"refusal to bargain" route to judicial review is not open to them (because it is not a violation of section 8 for a union that is not the bargaining representative of the employees involved to refuse to bargain), hence,
that there must be an alternative route to insure judicial review of the
Board's action. Finally, employees have occasionally sought judicial review of Board representation decisions, alleging, quite correctly, that
there is no conceivable way in which they can initiate the statutory review
procedure so that, unless an alternative route exists, their interests are
totally at the mercy of the employer and the union-neither of whom,
for reasons of their own, may be interested in challenging a Board decision prejudicial to particular employees.
It was not until 1958 that the Supreme Court addressed itself to
the question whether a federal district court may review a Board representation decision,' and, though the Court has twice since dealt with
the problem,' it is by no means clear that the last word has been spoken.
Hence, I should like to review some of the litigation, and the arguments
that have been advanced, and make a few suggestions as to the availability, under the NLRA, of district court review of Board representation
decisions.
STATUTORY ARGUMENTS

The statute on its face provides some support for the Board's view
that judicial review of representation decisions is limited to the indirect
route provided in section 9(d). First, it is clear, and was early held
that direct review in the courts of appeals under section 10(f) was not
jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."
6. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
7. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963);
Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
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contemplated.8 Thus, section 10(f) speaks of review of a "final order"
of the Board. Wholly apart from the question whether a decision directing an election or certifying the results of that election constitutes a
"final order" as that term is generally utilized for purposes of judicial
review of administrative orders,9 it is apparent on close examination of
section 9 that the term "final order," or even the term "order," is not
to be found in any portion of that section. The Board is to "decide"
the appropriate unit, "investigate" representation petitions, "provide"
for hearings, "find" whether a question of representation exists, "direct"
an election and "certify" the results thereof. The only reference to an
"order" of the Board contained in section 9 is in sub-paragraph (d),
which refers to orders of the Board issued pursuant to section 10(c) and
which is the section providing for the indirect review procedure described
previously. From all this, it is evident that in providing for review of a
"final order" of the Board, section 10(f) refers only to those orders
issued pursuant to section 10(c), not to certifications, directions of elections, or any other Board action taken under section 9.'o
There is nothing on the face of the NLRA, however, which resolves
the question whether Congress intended to preclude district court review
of Board representation decisions. On the one hand, it can be argued
that if this were Congress' intent it would have so stated; indeed, in
view of the manifest inadequacy of the statutory review procedure, only
the plainest expression of an intent to preclude district court review
should suffice. The contrary argument, again limited to the face of
the statute, would be that Congress, having narrowly limited court of
appeals review of representation decisions to the situation in which such
a decision serves as the basis of an unfair labor practice order, would
hardly be willing to permit unlimited district court review of all representation decisions. This viewpoint would find additional support in
the fact that the act does confer jurisdiction upon the district courts
with respect to other matters. For example, section 11(2) empowers
the district court to entertain applications for the enforcement of subpoenas issued by the Board. Furthermore, on amending the act in 1947,
Congress added sections 10(j) and (1), which permit the district courts
8. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
9. Compare AFL v. NLRB, supra note 8, at 408, with the court of appeals' opinion
in that case, 103 F.2d 933, 935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
10. AFL v. NLRB, supra note 9, at 406-10. Nor may a court of appeals review a
section 9 representation decision because that decision rests on the same facts as an unfair
labor practice decision properly before the court for review. It is only when the unfair
labor practice decision is predicated on the representation decision that a court of appeals
has jurisdiction to review the latter. See NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 458-59
(1940); Hendrix Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F2d 100, 106 (5th Cir. 1963), and cases cited
therein.
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to grant temporary injunctive relief against conduct violative of the unfair labor practice sections of the act. Having thus undertaken to assign
a role to the district courts in the administration of the act, it could be
expected that Congress, had it desired them to play a part in representation proceedings, would have so stated.
THE

LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY

1935
However one might resolve the question of the availability of
district court review on the bare language of the statute, there is in fact
a substantial amount of legislative history that should also be considered.
One of the questions on which there appears to have been general agreement in the 74th Congress, which enacted the Wagner Act, was that
the provisions for judicial review of election orders contained in Public
Resolution 44,11 were unsatisfactory. Public Resolution 44, which created the first National Labor Relations Board to administer section 7(a)
of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 2 empowered the Board to conduct representation elections and provided for immediate judicial review
in the courts of appeals of any Board order directing an election. Experience with that resolution quickly showed that some employers would
utilize pre-election review as a means to delay the commencement of
collective bargaining. This, Congress found, was creating the very
industrial unrest that Public Resolution 44 was intended to prevent. The
Senate Report on the Wagner Act summarized the situation as follows:
Obstacles to elections-Under Public Resolution 44, any attempt by the government to conduct an election of representatives may be contested ab initio in the courts, although such
election is in reality merely a preliminary determination of fact.
This means that the government can be delayed indefinitely
before it takes the first step toward industrial peace. After
almost a year not a single case, in which a company has chosen
to contest an election order of the Board, has reached decision
13
in any circuit court of appeals.
The House Report was to the same effect:
The weakness of this [Public Resolution 44] procedure is
that under the provision for review of election orders employers
11. 48 Stat. 1183 (1934).
12. 48 Stat. 198 (1933).
13. S. REP. No. 573 (on S. 1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935), 2 LEGisLATrvE HIsTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 2305 (Gov't Printing Office 1935) (hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST. NLRA).
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have a means of holding up the election for months by an application to the circuit court of appeals.... At the present time
10 cases for review of the Board's election orders are pending
in the circuit court of appeals. Only three have been argued
and none have been decided.
The election is but a preliminary determination of fact, and
there is no reason why employers should have an opportunity
for court review prior to the holding of the election. The ability
of employers to block elections has been productive of a large
measure of industrial strife. When an employee organization
has built up its membership to a point where it is entitled to
be recognized as the representative of the employees for collective bargaining, and the employer refuses to accord such recognition, the union, unless an election can promptly be held to
determine the choice of representation, runs the risk of impairment of strength by attrition and delay while the case is dragging on through the courts, or else is forced to call a strike to
achieve recognition by its own power. Such strikes have been
called when election orders of the National Labor Relations
Board have been held up by court review.14
Congress' response to the experience gained under Public Resolulution 44 was to omit any provision for direct judicial review of Board
decisions in election proceedings. In lieu of the direct, pre-election
review available under Public Resolution 44, the Wagner Act provided
in section 9(d) that judicial review would be available only after the
election had been held, and then only if the Board ordered the employer
to do something predicated on the results of the election, i.e., to bargain
with the union. Thus, the Senate Report on the Wagner Act stated:
Section 9(d) makes it absolutely clear that there shall be
no right to court review anterior to the holding of an election.
An election is the mere determination of a preliminary fact,
and in itself has no substantial effect upon the rights of either
employers or employees. There is no more reason for court
review prior to an election than for court review prior to a
hearing. But if subsequently the Board makes an order predicated upon the election, such as an order to bargain collectively
with elected representatives, then the entire election procedure
becomes part of the record upon which the order of the Board is
14. H.R. REP. No. 972 (on S. 1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935), 2 LEG. HisT.
NLRA 2960-61. See also the testimony of Senator Wagner and Francis Biddle, Chairman
of the National Labor Relations Board, in Hearings on S. 1958 Belore the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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based, and is fully reviewable by any aggrieved party in the
Federal courts in the manner provided in Section 10. And
this review would include within its scope the action of the
Board in determining the appropriate unit for purposes of the
election. This provides a complete guarantee against arbitrary
action by the Board.15

Similarly, the House Report stated:
As previously stated in this Report, the efficacy of Public
Resolution 44 has been substantially impaired by the provision
for court review of election orders prior to the holding of the
election. Section 9(d) of the bill makes clear that there is to
be no court review prior to the holding of the election, and provides an exclusive, complete and adequate remedy whenever an
order of the Board made pursuant to section 10(c) is based in
whole or in part on facts certified following an election or other
investigation pursuant to section 9(c). The hearing required
to be held in any such investigation provides an appropriate
safeguard and opportunity to be heard. Since the certification
and the record of the investigation are required to be included
in the transcript of the entire record filed pursuant to section
10(e) or (f), the Board's actions and determinations of fact
and law in regard thereto will be subject to the same court
review as is provided for its other determinations under sections 10(b) and 10(c)."6
The clear import of the foregoing legislative history would appear
to be that the omission of any provision for direct judicial review of
Board election proceedings was deliberate, and was intended to prevent
15. S. RaP. No. 972 (on S. 1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935), 2 LEG. HimT. NLRA
2314.
16. H.R. REP. No. 972 (on S. 1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1935), 2 LEG. Hist.
NLRA 2977. See also Memorandum of March 11, 1935, prepared for the Senate Committee
on Education and Labor by Senator Wagner, comparing S. 1958 with S. 2926 (73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1935)), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), 1 LEG. HIsT. NLRA 1323:
Section 9(d) is a new provision intended to make it clear that when the
Board orders an election, persons affected by that order cannot come into court
until after the election has been held and the Board directs that the employer
take some action based upon the results of that election. At the present time employers are in a position where they can bring court proceedings to enjoin an
election even though they have not been directed to take any action based upon
the result of a poll. It seems wiser to limit employers as this bill does to complaining about elections only if the elections are made the basis of some order
directed against them.
See also Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Committee on Labor, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (1935), 2 LEG. Hisr. NLRA 2494 (testimony of Senator Taft); 79 CoNG. Rac.
7658 (daily ed. May 15, 1935), 2 LEG. Hisr. NLRA 2370 (remarks of Senator Walsh).
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employers from utilizing direct review as a means of delaying representation elections. Employers were not left without judicial review of
Board representation decisions, but were restricted to the review provided
in section 9 (d), "review in the courts only after the election has been held
and the Board has ordered the employer to do something predicated on
the results of the election."' 7 This review, albeit delayed, was characterized by the Senate Report on the Wagner Act as providing "a complete
guarantee against arbitrary action by the Board"' 8 and by the House9
Report as providing for "exclusive, complete and adequate remedy."'
1939
Although section 9(d) of the Wagner Act allowed employers to
obtain review only after the election, it made no provision whatsoever
for union review of election orders or certifications. A union dissatisfied with a Board decision in a certification proceeding, e.g., a decision
to certify the results of an election lost by the union but which the union
claimed had been directed in an inappropriate unit, could not trigger
an unfair labor practice charge against itself by refusing to bargain
with the employer-there were no union unfair labor practices. While
some elections involved two unions, and in those it was conceivable that
the employer might refuse to bargain with the union that won the
election on the same grounds that formed the basis for the losing union's
protest, and that the losing union would be allowed to intervene in the
employer's suit, this would hardly be regarded by union as a satisfactory
guarantee of judicial review. Two bills were introduced in the 76th
Congress to remedy this situation, both of which provided that any
labor organization aggrieved by a section 9 certification could obtain
direct review of the certification in the courts of appeals.2" Both bills
were the subject of hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, and the expanded review provisions of both were the
subject of adverse testimony by Charles Fahy, General Counsel of the
Board. The essence of Mr. Fahy's objections was that:
Whereas prior to the present act employers used this review of certifications or direction of elections as a means of
defeating collective bargaining, rival unions would now do
so. I do not see how either organization could gain advantages
17. 79 CoNG. Rc. 7658 (daily ed. May 15, 1935), 2 LEG. Hist. NLRA 2370.
18. S. RaP. No. 573 (on S. 1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935), 2 LEG. Hist. NLRA
2314.
19. H.R. RaP. No. 972 (on S. 1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935), 2 LEG. HIsT.
NLRA 2977.
20. S. 1000, S. 1264, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). S. 1264 went beyond S. 1000 in
providing not only for direct review of certifications, but also for direct review of orders
directing elections.
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in the long run, and it is obvious the public interest would suffer.
It is better to suffer dissatisfaction with some unit determinations, than to have each bound up in long drawn-out litigation easily initiated by rival or minority groups. You would
afford a method for the destruction of collective bargaining
by this provision."
Neither of the proposed amendments (or any other part of the
bills involved) was enacted into legislation. Hence there continued to
be no statutory method whereby labor organizations could obtain judicial
review of election proceedings.
1947
In 1947, when the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act were under consideration, the bill that passed the House
contained an amendment to section 10(f) which would have permitted
any aggrieved person to obtain direct post-election review of a Board
certification in the courts of appeals. 2 The reason for this proposed alteration was stated to be the inadequacy of judicial review under existing
law. Thus, the House Committee Report stated:
Appeals from certification.-

.

.

.

The present act permits

appeals from certifications by the Board only by employers, and
then only through cumbersome proceedings that always involve
risk of strike and of a finding that, by following the only course
by which he could appeal, the employer committed an unfair
labor practice, no matter how much in good faith he doubted
the validity of the certification. This procedure is unfair to
everyone; the union that wins, which frequently must wait
for many months to exercise its rights; the union that loses,
which has no appeal at all no matter how wrong the certification
may be; the employees, who also have no appeal; and the employer, for whom an appeal involves grave risk. This bill permits any person interested to appeal from a certification, as from
a final order of the Board.3
21. Hearings on S. 1000, 1264, 1392, 1550, 1580, and 2123 Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 462-63 (1939). See also id. at 445-47,

460-62, 583-87.
22. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 1

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 199-200, 350-51 (Gov't Printing Office 1948) (hereinafter

cited as LEG. HIST. LMRA).
23. H.R. REP. No. 245 (on H.R. 3020), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947), 1 LEG. Hisr.

LMRA 334.
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Despite the catalogue of inadequacies spelled out by the Committee
Report, the proposed amendment was deleted in conference in favor of
the Senate bill, which continued the existing provisions for judicial review without alteration.'
According to Senator Taft, the reason for
the deletion was that the House bill "would permit dilatory tactics in
representation proceedings."2 5
In view of this history, it would appear plain that Congress' failure
in 1947, as in 1935 and 1939, to provide for direct review of Board
representation decisions was anything but inadvertent.2 6 Rather, the
Public Resolution 44 experience seems to have persuaded Congress that
whatever the disadvantages of limiting judicial review to the circuitous
section 9 (d) route, they are, as a general rule, less than the disadvantages
of direct review-either before or after an election.
LITIGATION PRIOR To KYNE :27 DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION

PREDICATED ON A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
As previously noted, the Supreme Court early held, in AFL v.
NLRB," that section 10(f) of the act did not confer jurisdiction on the
courts of appeals to review Board representation proceedings, save
as incidental to review of unfair labor practice proceedings. In other
words, direct review of representation proceedings could not be had
in the courts of appeals. The Court did not, however, decide whether
such review was available in the district courts. "That question," the
Court stated, "can be appropriately answered only upon a showing in
such a suit that unlawful action of the Board has inflicted an injury
on the petitioners for which the law, apart from the review provisions
of the Wagner Act, affords a remedy." 29
24. H.R. REx. No. 510 (on H.R. 3020), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1947), 1 LEG.
Hxsr. LMRA 560-61.
25. 93 CONG. REc. 6602 (daily ed. June 5, 1947), 2 LEG. HisT. LMRA 1542. The
Minority Report on the House bill stated this objection in somewhat greater detail. H.R.
REP. No. 245 (on H.R. 3020), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1947), 1 LEG. Hxsr. LMRA 385:
9. Review of certifications
Section 10(f) would amend the National Labor Relations Act to permit interlocutory review of Board certifications. If this proposal is enacted into law it
would have serious adverse consequences on collective bargaining. It is conservatively estimated that 1 year would be the average time necessary to obtain court
review of a Board certification. The same findings would be reviewable twice:
First, under the proposed amendment and, second, through later or simultaneous
section 8(a) (5) proceedings under the act if the employer refused to bargain.
Delay would be piled upon delay, during which time collective bargaining would
be suspended pending determination of the status of the bargaining agent. Such
delays can only result in industrial strife.
26. No proposals were made at the time of the 1959 amendments to alter the existing
statutory provisions for judicial review of representation cases.
27. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).

28. 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
29. Id. at 412.
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The question whether Congress had foreclosed district court review
of Board representation decisions was not answered by the Supreme
Court for nearly twenty years, with the lower courts in the meantime
going both ways." In the interim, the Supreme Court gave a strong
indication in Switchmen's Union v. NMB 31 that jurisdiction might not
be found to exist, 2 but once again avoided the issue in Inland Empire
Dist. Council v. Millis.3 In Inland Empire, a union that had been defeated in a representation election challenged the Board's proceedings
on the ground that the Board had failed to provide the "appropriate
hearing" which section 9(c) requires, and that the effect was not only to
deny it the statutory right to a hearing but also to deny it due process
of law contrary to the guarantee of the fifth amendment. The Court,
acting without much regard for logical consistency, reviewed and rejected the union's claims on the merits, then held that since the Board
had not been shown to have acted unlawfully, either by departing from
statutory requirements or by departing from requirements of due process,
it was unnecessary to. decide whether the federal courts had jurisdiction
to review a Board election proceeding to determine whether it had acted
unlawfully. In other words, the Court reviewed, but without deciding
whether it had jurisdiction to review. 4
Perhaps the most significant of the lower court decisions in the
interim between AFL and Kyne, at least in terms of its lasting effect,
was Fay v. Douds 5 In Fay, an incumbent union which had been denied
a place on the ballot in an election to be held on the petition of another
union, and which had also been denied a hearing on the question whether
an election should be held, brought suit against the Board's regional
director to enjoin the election. The complaint alleged that the regional
30. Among the cases in which district court jurisdiction was found to exist were

Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949); Farmer v. United Elec. Workers, 211 F.2d 36
(D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954); Klein v. Herrick, 41 F. Supp. 417
(S.D.N.Y. 1941); Reilly v. Millis, 52 F. Supp. 172 (D.D.C. 1943), afl'd, 144 F.2d 259
(D.C. Cir. 1944); R. J. Reynolds Employees' Ass'n v. NLRB, 61 F. Supp. 280 (M.D.N.C.
1943); Worthington Pump & Mach. Co. v. Douds, 97 F. Supp. 656, reafl'd, 28 L.R.RLM.
2267 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Cases in which district court jurisdiction was found not to exist

include Madden v. Brotherhood of Transit Employees, 147 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1945); Fitzgerald v. Douds, 167 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1948); Norris v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir.
1949); Volney Felt Mills v. LeBus, 196 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1952); DePratter v. Farmer, 232
F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
31. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
32. In Switchmen's, a case arising under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926),
45 u.s.c. §§ 151-88 (1964), the Court held (4-3) that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction to review a determination of appropriate bargaining unit by the National Mediation
Board, despite the fact that the Railway Labor Act made no alternative provision for judicial review of NMB decisions.
33. 325 U.S. 697 (1945).
34. See 4 DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW § 28.02, at 4-5 (1959).
35. 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949).
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director's refusal to hold a hearing constituted a denial of due process
of law and that his exclusion of the plaintiff union from the ballot was
unauthorized by the act. Injunctive relief was denied by the district
court and the complaint was dismissed. In the ensuing election the union
which had filed the election petition received a majority of votes and
was certified by the Board as the collective bargaining representative of
the employees involved.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff union's assertion that it had been denied due process of law by the regional director's
refusal to conduct a hearing was not "transparently frivolous," and that
a constitutional claim of this magnitude vested the district court with
jurisdiction to consider that claim on the merits. Further, held the court,
once having obtained jurisdiction, a district court could, and should,
dispose of all other questions raised by the plaintiff, even though, absent
their joinder with the constitutional claim, the district court would be
without jurisdiction to consider them. In the context of Fay, that meant
that the plaintiff was entitled to district court review both of its constitutional claim and its contention that the regional director's refusal to
place it on the ballot was unauthorized by the act. On the merits, however, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that both these
claims were lacking in substance. Hence the court affirmed the district
court's judgment denying injunctive relief and dismissing the complaint.
The decision in Fay is hardly surprising. Whether or not the Constitution requires that federal judicial review of constitutional claims
be available,3 6 it is not likely that a court, absent explicit evidence to the
contrary, would hold that Congress intended to bar such review. Congress had, however, as recently as 1947, rejected an amendment providing
for judicial review of Board certifications, in the courts of appeals, despite
the argument that absent such an amendment, "the union that loses .
has no appeal at all no matter how wrong the certification may be." 37
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit did not regard that as evidence that
Congress had intended to deprive the district courts of jurisdiction to
review actions of the Board on constitutional grounds.
The holding in Fay v. Douds-that a losing union, with no other
means to obtain judicial review, may raise a substantial constitutional
question in a district court has not been challenged by the Board in subsequent litigation. Rather, in suits claiming constitutional violations
36. See Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943): "All constitutional

questions aside, it is for Congress to determine how the rights which it creates shall be
enforced." See generally JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 381-89

(1965).

37. H.R. REP. No. 245 (on H.R. 3020), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947), 1 LEG.

LMRA 334, set out in text accompanying note 23 supra.

Hist.
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the Board has defended on the merits. Additionally, where the plaintiff
has access to the statutory review procedure, the argument has been made
that district court review should not be granted, since it is unnecessary
to satisfy the presumed congressional intent that there be some forum
available for the litigation of constitutional claims."8 The argument
that where the plaintiff has an alternative review procedure, district
court review even of constitutional claims should not be available has met
with a mixed reception. 9 On the other hand, the Board has rarely
been found, on the merits, to have denied constitutional protections in
the course of an election proceeding.4" In any event, litigation has
tended to focus on these issues, especially the latter, and to accept the
holding of Fay that, at least where no other judicial review is available,
a district court has jurisdiction to review Board representation proceedings on the basis of a claim, not transparently frivolous, that the
Board has denied constitutional rights.4
One aspect of Fay that would seem open to question is the conclusion
that once a district court determines that the plaintiff has made out a
colorable claim of constitutional violation, it is then free to decide not
only the constitutional claim, but all other questions relating to the Board's
decision. While the necessity for judicial review of constitutional errors
may outweigh the interest in speedy resolution of questions of representation, it is not apparent why the interest in speedy resolution should be
impaired pro tanto by review of non-constitutional claims solely because
the latter are joined with a colorable constitutional claim. For example,
if the plaintiff can make out a prima facie claim that the Board has
denied him a hearing on a crucial factual issue, it is plain that he is
38. See, e.g., Worthington Pump & Mach. Co. v. Douds, 97 F. Supp. 656, reafl'd, 28
L.R.R.M. 2267 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
39. Compare Volney Felt Mills v. LeBus, 196 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1952), and General
Cable Corp. v. Leedom, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960), with Empresa Hondurena de
Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Worthington Pump & Mach. Co. v. Douds, supra note 38;
Greensboro Hosiery Mills v. Johnston, 60 L.R.R.M. 2060 (M.D.N.C. July 14, 1965), appeal
pending, No. 10164 (4th Cir.). See also Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d

17, 21 n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824 (1965).
40. The only reported case in which a district court has granted injunctive relief on
the grounds that the plaintiff had shown the Board to have violated the Constitution, and
which was not reversed on appeal, is Greensboro Hosiery Mills v. Johnston, supra note 39.
Some of the cases in which constitutional challenges have been rejected are cited in Boire v.
Miami Herald Publishing Co., supra note 39.
41. But see Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 64 L.R.R.M. 2631, 2635 (2d Cir. 1967). See
also the concurring opinion of Wright, J., in Lawrence Typographical Union v. McCulloch,
349 F.2d 704, 709 n.l. (D.C. Cir. 1965): 'The Fifth Circuit has recently expressed doubt
as to whether a constitutional violation should be a separate ground for jurisdiction. Boire

v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., supra, 343 F.2d 21, n.7." An examination of Miami
Herald, however, suggests that the Fifth Circuit's doubts may be limited to the availability
of district court jurisdiction where the plaintiff has access to the statutory review procedure.
See note 39 supra.
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entitled to district court review of that constitutional claim. Now suppose he also asserts that the Board's decision on the factual issue is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. Fay appears to hold
that even if the constitutional claim fails on the merits the plaintiff is
entitled to review on the factual issue. To permit review on an essentially evidentiary issue, however, may substantially delay judicial
decision and final resolution of the question of representation. Nor
is review of this issue necessary to insure that the constitutional right
to a fair hearing is not infringed. Hence, it is not plain that a colorable
constitutional claim should vest a district court with jurisdiction to hear
all issues in a case, non-constitutional as well as constitutional.
The Second Circuit relied on Hillsborough Tounrship v. Crowell"
as authority for the proposition that a colorable constitutional claim vests
a district court with power to decide all issues in the case. In Hillsborough, a suit for a declaratory judgment that certain state taxes violated
the constitution, the Supreme Court had held that when a federal district
court has jurisdiction of a case because that case presents a substantial
constitutional issue, the district court may pass on the whole case including any state law questions that may be involved. The analogy, though
superficially apt, does not withstand analysis. The reason a federal court
with jurisdiction to decide a constitutional (or other federal) claim may
also decide state law issues when it denies the federal claim is to avoid
the necessity of a second lawsuit in the state courts on the state claim. 43
Were a federal court, on denying a constitutional challenge to a Board
decision to dismiss the case, there would not, however, be a second lawsuit in the state courts or elsewhere, to the contrary, further judicial review would be unavailable. Nor would this result be inadvertent; it
would, rather, accord with Congress' intent, as interpreted by the Second
Circuit prior to the time Pay was decided, that non-constitutional claims
should not be subject to judicial review at all, except to the extent they
may be raised through the statutory review procedure.44 In short, while
the assertion in Fay that the district court had jurisdiction to review
constitutional claims may have been sound, the extension of that jurisdiction to non-constitutional claims that would otherwise not have been
reviewable is at least questionable."
42. 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
43. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 723-26 (1966).
44. Fitzgerald v. Douds, 167 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1948).
45. Subsequent expansion of district court review jurisdiction to include claims of
statutory violation [see Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958)] does not moot this criti-

cism. There remain some issues not reviewable in the district courts (e.g., issues of fact,

Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes
102-09 infra) and review thereof ought not be obtainable simply because a prima facie

claim of statutory or constitutional violation has been made out in the complaint.
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LEEDOM v. KYNE

Finally, in Leedom v. Kyne,4 6 the Supreme Court addressed itself to
the issue of whether, constitutional claims aside, the federal district courts
were empowered to review Board representation proceedings. In Kyne
the Buffalo Section, Westinghouse Engineers Association, a labor organization, petitioned the Board to hold an election among 223 non-supervisory professional employees of a Westinghouse plant. A competing
labor organization, which was permitted by the Board to intervene
in the representation proceedings, asked the Board to expand the unit
to include additional employees who performed technical work and who
were thought by it to be "professional employees" within the meaning of
section 2(12) of the act. The Board found that none of the additional
employees were "professional employees" under the act's definition of
that term. Nonetheless, it held that nine of these employees should be
included in the unit because they shared a close community of interests
with the professional employees and because their inclusion would not
destroy the predominantly professional character of the unit.
The Association then requested the Board to take a vote among the
223 professional employees to determine whether a majority of them
wished to be included in a unit with non-professionals. This request was
made pursuant to section 9(b) (1), which provides that, in determining
the unit appropriate for collective bargaining purposes, "the Board shall
not ...decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit
includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees
vote for inclusion in such unit." The Board, however, denied the request,
on the theory that section 9(b) (1) was intended to provide professional
employees with a veto over their inclusion in the same unit with nonprofessionals only when the professionals constituted a minority in the
proposed bargaining unity7 An election was then held among the employees in the combined unit. The Association received a majority of
the ballots cast and was certified by the Board as the collective bargaining agent for the entire unit, professionals and non-professionals alike.
Thereafter, the Association brought suit against the Board in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Board had
46. Supra note 45.
47. The Board's view was that the purpose of § 9(b) (1) was to prevent it from submerging a small number of professional employees into a large bargaining unit in which
their distinctive interests might be ignored. This danger would' not be present where the
professionals, as in Kyne, constituted a substantial majority of the proposed unit. Hence,
the Board concluded, it need not conduct an election among the professionals in such
cases. See Continental Motors Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 345, 347-48 (1948); see also Brief for the
NLRB in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), pp. 33-37.
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violated section 9(b) (1) by including professional employees in a unit
with non-professionals without the consent of the former. The district
court, over the Board's objection that it lacked jurisdiction and that, in
any event, the Board had acted properly, held both that it had jurisdiction
and that the Board had violated section 9(b) (1) by failing to afford the
professional employees a self-determination election. Accordingly, the
court ordered the Board's certification set aside. 48
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the
Board did not contest the trial court's conclusion that it had violated
section 9(b) (1), but argued that nonetheless the district court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the Association's action. In part, the Board's
argument that the district court was without jurisdiction rested on the
fact that the Association could obtain judicial review via the section 10
route. Thus, the Board pointed out, just as section 8(a) (5) makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the union
that is the representative of his employees, section 8(b) (3) makes it an
unfair labor practice for that union to refuse to bargain with the employer. Accordingly, the Association, contending that the Board's certification of a combined unit of professional employees and non-professionals
violated the act, could insist that Westinghouse bargain with it solely as
the representative of the professional employees. Such a refusal would
subject the Association to a charge, filed by either the employer or the
non-professional employees, that it had violated section 8 (b) (3). Should
the Board then find a violation and issue an order directing the Association to bargain for all the employees in the certified unit, the Association
could obtain review of that order and the underlying certification in the
court of appeals, pursuant to sections 9(d) and 10(e), just as the employer could if he were contesting the certification. 49
The court of appeals affirmed the district court, finding that the
Board had violated a statutory requirement with resulting injury to the
Association. As to the Board's argument that the Association could
obtain section 10 review, the court stated:
Whether, granting the availability of a § 10 remedy, the
injury flowing from the violation of § 9(b) (1) would support equitable relief need not be decided. Here review by
way of § 10 is too remote and conjectural to be viewed as
providing an adequate remedy. . . . Since the employer is not
aggrieved by the Board's inclusion of the nine non-professionals,
48. 148 F. Supp. 597 (D.D.C. 1956).
49. Cf. Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 103, 109-12 (S.D.
N.Y. 1956), afld, 241 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1957).
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he cannot be relied upon to refuse to bargain and thus make it
possible for the Association to bring a reviewable § 10 proceeding. Nor is it likely that an Engineers Association refusal to
bargain for the nine non-professionals would induce the employer to seek review since he would then be free to deal with all
employees individually. Nor could we expect such refusal to
induce any of the nine non-professionals to seek review. They
are hardly likely to insist upon placing their fate in the hands
of a reluctant bargaining representative.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court's reasoned that initially
the Board's inclusion of professionals in the same unit with non-professionals was an attempted exercise of power that had been specifically
withheld by Congress in enacting section 9(b) (1). Thus, this was not
a suit to "review" a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction,
but one to strike down an order of the Board made "in excess of its
delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act."5
Furthermore, the Board's action deprived the professional employees of
a "right" assured them by Congress-the right not to be included in a
bargaining unit with non-professionals without their consent. Finally,
the Court had stated in Switchmen's5 1 that when the absence of federal
court jurisdiction would leave congressionally created rights unenforceable, the inference might legitimately be drawn that Congress intended
the district courts to have jurisdiction under the general jurisdictional
grants. That was precisely the situation here, said the Court, for the
professional employees had no "other means, within their control . . .
to protect and enforce" their right to a self-determination election. Hence,
the inference of district court jurisdiction would be drawn.
Analysis of Kyne might appropriately begin with the Court's characterization of that suit as not one to "review" a decision of the Board
made within its jurisdiction, but one to strike down an order of the
Board in excess of its powers. As Professor Cox long ago pointed out52
this is sheer word play. The Board had "jurisdiction" of the parties and
of the subject matter. Additionally, it was empowered to determine what
constituted an appropriate bargaining unit. The error with which it had
been charged, and which it had conceded, was simply that it had misconstrued section 9(b) (1). Thus, what the Court was really holding,
albeit thinly disguised in "jurisdictional" terms, was that the district
50. 358 U.S. at 188.
51. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
52. Cox, The Major Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court, October Term 1958,
AMERICAN BAP AsSN, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1959 PROCEEDINGS 23, 31-37, reprinted in GELLHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

(4th ed. 1960).
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courts are authorized to set aside representation decisions of the Board
that rest upon errors of statutory construction-at least in a situation in
which, as the Court saw it, review under the statutory procedure was
unavailable.
This holding presents two questions: (1) Was the Court right in
viewing Kyne as a case in which statutory review was unavailable to
the Association; (2) Assuming so, was it right in its conclusion that
district court review was therefore available? Let us consider first the
Court's conclusion that statutory review was unavailable to the Association. Admittedly, the professional employees, or their representative,
the Association, could not file a section 10(f) petition in the court of
appeals to review the contested certification. AFL v. NLRB53 settled
that. But why could not the Association simply refuse to bargain for
the non-professionals, as the Board had argued in the court of appeals
(and in the Supreme Court, although without much conviction in the
latter),5 4 and thus provoke a section 8(b) (3) unfair labor practice
charge, which would, if sustained by the Board, enable the Association
to obtain review under sections 10(f) and 9(d) of both the unfair labor
practice finding and the underlying certification? The obvious answer
to this argument, the one given by the court of appeals, was that the
likelihood of anyone filing a charge against the Association was too remote for the section 10 review procedure to constitute an adequate
remedy. Neither the employer nor the non-professionals were likely to
file an unfair labor practice charge to compel the Association to bargain
for the non-professionals.
But if the Association, as a practical matter, were free to decline to
bargain for the non-professionals, since no one would seek to compel it
to bargain for them, how was the Association, or the professional employees it represented, injured by the Board's certification of it to represent the non-professionals? The mere fact of the certification, standing
alone, and unsupported by any order directing the Association to comply
with it would result in no injury to the Association or the professional
employees, who would be free to ignore the non-professionals in formulating their bargaining demands and dealing with the employer. If the
Association were to ignore the non-professionals in bargaining with the
employer, then as a practical matter the bargaining unit would be composed solely of professionals, just as the Association wished. And, if
the non-professionals were subsequently to file a charge, and seek to
compel bargaining on their behalf, section 10 review would be available.
Thus I have some difficulty in accepting the Court's conclusion that
53. 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
54. See Brief for the NLRB, pp. 21-22 n.12.
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absent district court review the professional employees would have had
no means of protecting their right not to be in a mixed unit of professionals and non-professionals. 55
But even assuming that the Court was correct in its conclusion that
district court review was necessary to protect the rights of the professional employees, the question remains whether it follows that district
court review was available. The Court answered the question by quoting
from Switchmen's, wherein the "controlling principles" were stated: "If
the absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts meant a sacrifice or
obliteration of a right which Congress had created, the inference would
be strong that Congress intended the general jurisdictions of those courts
to control. That was the purport of the decisions of this Court in Texas
& New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, and
Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515." 5
The Court's reliance on the "sacrifice or obliteration" concept enunciated in Switchmen's was, however, misplaced. For, as Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent,57 what that language referred to, in context, was the situation in which Congress had created a "right," but no
tribunal, judicial or administrative, was explicitly empowered to enforce
that right. It was in that situation, as exemplified by both Texas & New
Orleans R.R.5" and Virginian Ry.,5 that the Court had indulged in the
inference that, despite its silence on the matter, Congress intended that
the federal courts should have jurisdiction to enforce the right created
0
by it, since otherwise the right created would be unenforceable.
55. One possible argument to support the Court's conclusion, albeit one that appears
not to have been considered by the Court, is that while the non-professionals might not
file charges with the NLRB seeking to compel the Association to bargain for them, they
might file a suit for damages against the Association if it did not do so, claiming that the
Association had breached its duty under the NLRA to represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Syres v. Oil
Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam), reversing 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). While the Association would presumably be free to assert the
invalidity of the Board's certification of the bargaining unit in such a suit, the danger of
a money judgment if it did not prevail on that contention might lead one to conclude that
it should have an opportunity to challenge the certification without running that risk.
56. 358 U.S. at 190.
57. Id. at 199-201.
58. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
59. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
60. In Texas & New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930),
the employer sought to prevent the organization of its emplbyees in violation of § 2, Third,
of the Railway Labor Act, 45 u.s.c. § 152 Third (1964), which provided that employees
were to be free to select representatives "without interference, influence or coercion" by
the employer. Congress had not designated any administrative tribunal for enforcement
of this provision, nor had it explicitly provided for judicial enforcement. Unless the courts
had jurisdiction under grants of general jurisdiction, there would thus be no protection of
the employees' right to self-organization. Similarly, in Virginian Ry. v. System Federation,
300 U.S. 515 (1937), the Court held the federal courts had jurisdiction to order an employer to obey the command of § 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act, that it "treat with"
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On the other hand, in Switchmen's, where Congress had provided
an administrative agency to protect the right created by it, the Court
declined to infer that Congress intended the federal courts to be open
for review of that agency's action. For, while there might be dissatisfaction with the agency's interpretation of the right involved, it could
not be said in Switchmen's, at least in the sense in which it had been
said in the Texas and Virginian cases, that absent federal court jurisdiction there would be a "sacrifice or obliteration" of the right. In Kyne
also, Congress had created an administrative agency to protect the rights
created by it, including the right of professional employees to be free from
involuntary inclusion in a unit with non-professionals. Hence, it could
not be said in Kyne, any more than in Switchmen's, that an absence of
jurisdiction would mean a "sacrifice or obliteration" of rights created by
Congress-at least not in the sense in which the "sacrifice or obliteration"
language had been used in Switchmen's.
But, one might respond, this is too narrow a view. While there
may have been an agency created to enforce the right involved in Kyne,
as in Switchmen's, in the latter case the agency was at least making a
bona fide effort to enforce the right committed to it for protection. That
is, the NMB, in Switchmen's, had construed the Railway Labor Act as
compelling the unit determination made by it.61 On the other hand, the
NLRB, in Kyne, was making no effort to protect the professional employees' right to a self-determination election; indeed, it conceded that it
was failing to abide by the statutory requirement that it do so. Thus,
absent judicial review in Kyne there would be a "sacrifice or obliteration"
of the professional employees' rights in the very sense in which that term
had been used in the Texas and Virginian cases, i.e., no administrative
agency was protecting that right, so that if the courts were not available,
the right would go unprotected.
The foregoing reasoning is unpersuasive. Initially, the Board's
position in Kyne was not that it was ignoring the protections afforded
professional employees by the act. Rather, the Board had simply not
contested, in the court of appeals, the trial court's conclusion that it had
erred in its construction of section 9(b) (1). Thus Kyne was not a case
of an agency's refusal to take action to protect a right entrusted to that
agency, but rather a case of an agency's erroneous construction of the
nature of the right involved. And, while the Board had not contested
the proposition that its construction was erroneous, it was plain that this
the certified representative of its employees, because without such relief the employer would
have been free to ignore the act, which at that time provided no agency for enforcement
of the rights therein created. See 358 U.S. at 200 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
61. 320 U.S. at 309 (Reed, J., dissenting).
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was only a matter of litigation tactics, designed to elicit the Court's view
on the question whether judicial review was available to test decisions
made by it in the course of section 9 proceedings. Thus, the real question before the Court in Kyne was simply whether Congress had intended
to permit the district courts to review representation determinations made
by the Board, the agency to which Congress had primarily entrusted the
administration of the act.
The legislative history of the NLRA would appear to cut rather
strongly against the view that Congress intended to permit district court
review of Board representation determinations. As has been shown
earlier in this article, the experience with Public Resolution 44, which
provided for judicial review in the courts of appeals of orders directing
elections, and which enabled employers to delay substantially the holding
of such elections, with consequent industrial strife, persuaded Congress
that the Wagner Act should contain no provision for pre-election review.
Accordingly, section 9(d) was written to provide "for review in the
courts only after the election has been held and the Board has ordered
the employer to do something predicated upon the results of the election." 2 Furthermore, the section 9(d) review procedure was described
as providing an "exclusive, complete and adequate remedy." 3 Finally,
when it was proposed to Congress in both 1939 and 1947 that the
statutory review procedure was inadequate, and that direct post-election
review of Board certifications should be available in the courts of appeals,
those proposals were rejected because, as Senator Taft stated in 1947,
"such provision would permit dilatory tactics in representation proceedings."" 4 Direct review of Board certifications in the district courts
would be equally productive of delay in the commencement of collective
bargaining. Hence, the inference to be drawn from the legislative history
would appear to be that to permit district court review would be contrary
to the congressional intent. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit observed prior
to Kyne that: "It is hardly possible that Congress should have intended
to permit review by district courts of 9(c) proceedings while so carefully
limiting review of such proceedings in the circuit courts of appeals to
cases in which an order under 10(c) has been entered."6 5
The Kyne majority did not respond at all to the Board's legislative
history argument. The Association's response was this: True, the legislative history shows an intent to prevent such judicial review as would
62. 79 CoNG. REc. 7658 (daily ed. May 15, 1935), 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA 2370.
63. H.R. REP. No. 972 (on S. 1958), 74th Cong, 1st Sess. 20-21 (1935), 2 LEG. Hisr.
NLRA 2977.
64. 93 CONG. REc. 6602 (daily ed. June 5, 1947), 2 LEG. Hisr. LMRA 1542.
65. Madden v. Brotherhood of Transit Employees, 147 F.2d 439, 442 (4th Cir. 1945).
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permit dilatory tactics in representation proceedings. It does not, however, show that Congress' concern over delay reached the point of precluding such limited review as would be necessary to prevent the Board
from violating a plain statutory limitation on its powers. Indeed, it is
inconceivable that Congress would have written into the act explicit
limitations on the Board's powers-such as the section 9(b) (1) limitation on mixing professionals with non-professionals without the consent
of the former-and then have left it to the Board's untrammeled discretion whether or not it would abide by those limitations. 6
The foregoing argument is not without force. On the other hand,
it is far from inconceivable that Congress would have thought that the
delay inherent in permitting a losing union to contest its rival's certification by means of district court review, even review limited to ascertaining
whether the Board had violated any statutory limitation on its powers,
outweighed the benefits of such review. In the first place, there is no
significant likelihood that a majority of the five-man Board would intentionally flout the commands of Congress as enunciated in the act. At
worst, there is some danger that the Board will misinterpret or improperly apply the act, or certain portions of it. Indeed, that is arguably
what occurred in Kyne. Judicial review is not, however, a guarantee
against statutory misinterpretation. Furthermore, if the district courts
are to be free to set aside Board action in those cases in which the Board
has acted contrary to a statutory prohibition, it would follow that those
courts would have jurisdiction to entertain any action in which a colorable
claim is made that the Board has so erred. And, once the district courts
have jurisdiction to decide whether the Board has violated the act, two
dangers are present. Initially, there is the danger that the district courts,
faced with novel questions under a complex and unfamiliar statute, might
tend to find error and grant injunctive relief in a substantial number of
cases that would later be reversed on appeal, but not until the plaintiff had
obtained the delay in commencement of collective bargaining that frequently is the underlying reason for challenges to Board election determinations. Secondly, as Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent,
"even when the Board wins such a case on the merits, . . . while the

case is dragging through the courts the threat will be ever present of
the industrial strife sought to be averted by Congress in providing only
drastically limited judicial review under section 9(d)." Hence, it is not
at all inconceivable that Congress would have precluded district court review altogether, even to a party lacking any statutory procedure for
66. Brief for Buffalo Section, Westinghouse Engineers Association, pp. 24-28.
67. Cf.Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949).
68. 358 U.S. at 196.
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review and claiming a violation of the act by the NLRB. Nevertheless,
the legislative history did not explicitly resolve this question. Under
these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Court, consistent with
its growing inclination to find a congressional intent to permit judicial
review,69 held that the Board's decision in Kyne, which, as the Court saw
it, would not have been subject to review under the statutory review
procedures, was subject to review under the general jurisdiction of the
district courts.
Whether or not the Court's decision in Kyne was correct as a matter
of statutory interpretation, that decision left open a number of questions,
the answers to which would substantially determine the impact of Kyne
on the administration of the NLRA. Initially, what decisions of the
Board would be subject to review in the district courts and what would
the scope of that review be? Second, may a party with access to the
statutory review procedure obtain review in the district courts? Third,
may the district courts review decisions directing elections as well as the
post-election certification reviewed in Kyne ?7o
QUESTIONS LEFT OPEN

By KYNE

The Scope of District Court Review
In Kyne, the Court characterized its action as not "reviewing" a
decision of the Board, but as "[striking] down an order of the Board
made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act. ' 71 Section 9, however, contains a number of limitations
and prohibitions directed to the Board's exercise of its delegated powers.
For example, the Board may direct an election only when a question of
representation exists (section 9(c) (1)); the election must take place in
a unit appropriate for collective bargaining (section 9(b)) ; and may not
be directed within twelve months of a valid election in the same unit
(section 9 (c) (3)). If a district court, in a suit to enjoin a Board election,
were to find that no question of representation existed, that the unit in
which the election was directed was not appropriate for collective bargaining, or that a prior election, set aside by the Board as invalid, was in
fact valid, that court could conclude, in the language of Kyne, that the
Board's order directing an election was "in excess of its delegated
powers." And, while only the prohibition against two valid elections within
twelve months is "specific," it is at least arguable that a court should be
as free to enjoin the Board from exceeding the clearly implied limitations
of the act-that it shall not direct elections in inappropriate units or where
69. See JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 339-53.
70. Cox, supra note 52.
71. 358 U.S. at 188.
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no question concerning representation exists-as to enjoin the Board
from exceeding explicit limitations. Hence, the extent to which Kyne
made available district court injunctive relief whenever the Board erroneously directed a representation election is not at all plain from a reading
of that decision.
Nor can the importance of this question be overestimated. While
the administration of the NLRA would perhaps not be significantly
hindered were the courts to grant injunctive relief only in truly extraordinary circumstances, such as a perfectly plain violation of a clear
statutory command, a tendency to issue injunctions-temporary or permanent-because the district court disagreed with the Board's unit finding, or with its determination that a question of representation existed,
would be serious. Not only are such questions contested in a great many
election proceedings, but they involve complex, labor relations concepts
with which most district judges are unfamilar. Hence, misunderstanding
of, and disagreement with, the Board's conclusions would probably be
frequent. And, were injunctive relief available in every case in which
the district court disagreed with the Board's decision, a party dissatisfied
with the Board's decision or, even more important, merely seeking delay
in the implementation of that decision for tactical reasons, would be
tempted to seek district court review, on the theory that the potential
gains, even if the suit were ultimately reversed on appeal, justified the
expense of litigation. Indeed, the fear that the Kyne exception to the
general rule of non-reviewability could not be confined within tolerable
grounds was explicitly adverted to by Justice Brennan in his dissent in
that case.72
In fact, however, as Judge Friendly has so colorfully pointed out:
"... [D]issenting opinions are not always a reliable guide to the meaning

of the majority; often their predictions partake of Cassandra's gloom
more than of her accuracy. 73 This has, at least, been true of Justice
Brennan's fears as to the probable effects of Kyne. For, since Kyne, the
lower courts have placed an extremely narrow construction on the scope
of district court review under that case. Thus the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a series of cases decided soon
after Kyne, held that Board representation decisions were not to be overturned solely because the Board might have erred in exercising its statutory authority to determine the unit appropriate for collective bargaining74
72. Id. at 195-96.
73. Local 1545, Carpenters Union v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 1960).
74. Leedom v. Norwich Printing Union, 275 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 362
U.S. 969 (1960); International Ass'n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d 514 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960).
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or the existence of a question of representation.7 5 In other words, an
unsound or unwise decision by the Board, at least on matters as to which
the Board was vested with discretion under the act, was not to be viewed
as a decision in excess of the Board's delegated powers within the meaning of Kyne; rather, the only question for the district court to decide was
whether the Board had violated a "clear statutory command""7 or a
Nor would it be enough
"clear and mandatory statutory command."7
to sustain district court jurisdiction that the plaintiff could point to a
specific command in section 9, for example the command of section
9 (c) (5) that in determining whether a unit is appropriate for bargaining
purposes, "the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be
controlling," and show that the Board's action would be held invalid under
that language if the question arose under the judicial review provisions
of section 10. A different standard of review was to be applied by the
district court, one under which the Board need show no more than that
"the statutory language itself and the legislative history sufficiently support its position to eliminate the essential requirement for district court
jurisdiction, namely a showing that the Board violated a 'clear and manFinally, the District of Columbia
datory' statutory prohibition.... ,
discretionary powers was inof
Board
exercise
unwise
Circuit held,"'
sufficient to make out a denial of due process of law insufficient to vest a
district court with jurisdiction.8"
75. National Biscuit Div. v. Leedom, 265 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 359 U.S.
1011 (1959); Leedom v. IBEW, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
76. Leedom v. Norwich Printing Union, 275 F.2d 628, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
77. International Ass'n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d 514, 516 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Leedom v. IBEW, 278 F.2d 237, 244 (1960).
78. International Ass'n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, supra note 77, at 516; see also
Leedom v. IBEW, supra note 77, at 244.
79. Leedom v. IBEW, supra note 78, at 243-44; see also Milk Drivers Union v. McCulloch, 306 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
80. The tests developed in the foregoing cases are occasionally said to define the
extent of district court jurisdiction to review a Board decision. See, e.g., Machinery Chauffeurs v. Madden, 343 F.2d 497, 499-500 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 822 (1965), affirming on different grounds, 57 L.R.R.M. 2284, 2285 (N.D. Il. 1964); Miami Newspaper
Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1963). It is more
accurate, however, to describe these cases as defining the circumstances under which a
district court has jurisdition to enjoin a Board decision. See, e.g., Boire v. Miami Herald
Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824 (1965); Empresa
Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1962), vacated and
remanded, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Consolidated Edison Co. v. McLeod, 202 F. Supp. 351, 35455 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 302 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1962); Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162,
165 n.6 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961). For as previously noted once it
was determined by Kyne that a district court might enjoin a Board decision that met certain standards, the district courts of necessity had power to entertain any action presenting
a prima facie claim that those standards had been violated. The only question in such a
case was whether injunctive relief should be granted. Cf. Note, 74 YALE L.J. 1282, 1291
n.58 (1965). It was to this question, or more specifically to the criteria to be utilized in
resolving this question, that the District of Columbia Circuit addressed itself in the cases
immediately following Kyne.
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The restrictive interpretation of district court jurisdiction to enjoin
representation decisions under Kyne enunciated by the District of Columbia Circuit in these early cases, consistently adhered to by that court,"'
and followed by the other circuits that have considered the question,"2
has resulted in few injunctions being granted by the district courts and
even fewer being sustained by the courts of appeals. In the eight years
since Kyne was decided, there are only 14 reported cases in which injunctions have been issued by federal district courts in cases involving
Board representation elections. 3 At the court of appeals level, injunctive
relief has been granted in only three cases, Greyhound Corp. v. Boire,s4
S.A. v. McLeod 5 and Miami Printing
Empresa Hondurena de Vapores,
88
Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch.
81. See Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, supra note 80; Leedom v. Fitch Sanatarium, 294
F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Local 130, IUEW v. McCulloch, 345 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Lawrence Typographical Union v. McCulloch, 349 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1965); cf. Kingsport
Press, Inc. v. McCulloch, 336 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964). But
see Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch, supra note 80.
82. See Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. Alpert, 318 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1963); Local 1545, Carpenters Union v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960); McLeod v. Local 476, United Bhd.
of Indus. Workers, 288 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1961); Consolidated Edison Co. v. McLeod,
302 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1962); Rock-Hills-Uris, Inc. v. McLeod, 344 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1965);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1965); Boire v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824 (1965) ; Eastern
Greyhound Lines v. Fusco, 323 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326
(6th Cir. 1965) ; Machinery Chauffeurs v. Madden, 343 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1965) ; Department Store Employees v. Brown, 284 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
934 (1961); Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 64 L.R.R.M. 2662 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Boyles Galvanizing Co. v. Waers, 291 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1961).
83. Norwich Printing Union v. Leedom, 45 L.R.R.M. 2589 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1959),
rev'd, 275 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 969 (1960); IBEW v. Leedom, 44
L.R.R.M. 2754 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1959), rev'd, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Local 476,
United Bhd. of Indus. Workers v. McLeod, 46 L.R.R.M. 2454, 3139 (E.D.N.Y. May 23.
1960), rev'd, 288 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1961); Fitch Sanatarium, Inc. v. Leedom, 294 F.2d 251
(D.C. Cir. 1961); Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras v. McCulloch, 201 F. Supp.
82 (D.D.C. 1962), aff'd, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) ; Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McCulloch, 50
L.R.R.M. 2041 (D.D.C. April 13, 1962); Greyhound Corp. v. Boire, 205 F. Supp. 686
(S.D. Fla.), afl'd, 309 F. 2d 397 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 473 (1964); Sprecher
Drilling Co. v. Waers, 329 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1964); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Boire, 54 L.R.R.M. 2415 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 1963), rev'd, 343 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S 824 (1965); Uyeda v. Brooks, 57 L.R.R.M. 2275 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30,
1964), rev'd, 365 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1965); Castle Constr. Co. v. Potter, 355 F.2d 212 (5th
Cir. 1966); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1966); Greensboro
Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Johnston, 60 L.RLM. 2060 (M.D.N.C. July 14, 1965), appeal pending,
No. 10164 (4th Cir.); Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C. 1966).
84. 309 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), affirming 205 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Fla.
1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
85. 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962), reversing 200 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), vacated
and remanded, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); see also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), affirming 201 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 1962); Owens-Illinois
Glass Co. v. McCulloch, 50 L.R.RM. 2041 (D.D.C. April 13, 1962).
86. 322 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The district court decision granting an injunction
in Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Johnston, 60 L.R.R.M. 2060 (M.D.N.C. July 14,
1965), is presently on appeal to the Fourth Circuit (No. 10164). No appeal was taken from
the decision in Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C. 1966).
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The most complicated of the three cases holding that injunctive relief
should be granted was Miami Pressmen's. In that case, the Board's
Regional Director had ordered an election in July 1962 among pressroom
employees of the Miami Herald Publishing Company, who, at the time,
were engaged in a valid economic strike. The election had been challenged by the employer before a district court in Florida, on the ground,
inter alia, that the employer's request for review of the Regional Director's decision, 7 which had been denied, had been considered by only
one member of the Board, contrary to section 3(b), which authorizes
delegation by the Board "to any group of three or more members any or
all of the powers which it may itself exercise." The Florida district court
had declined to enjoin the election, but had ordered the ballots cast therein
to be impounded pending final determination of the proceedings before it.
Prior to any further action by the court, the Board, which subsequently
conceded that the original order denying the employer's request for review had been passed on by only one member of the Board, vacated that
order, granted the employer's request for review, and set aside the election. The district court then dismissed the employer's action as moot,
since the Board had set aside the very election the employer sought to
enjoin.
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Subsequently the Board, this time acting by a three-member panel,
affirmed the original direction of election by its Regional Director, thus
finding that the employer's challenge to the election order was without
merit.89 The Board did not, however, reinstate the original election.
Rather, it ordered the Regional Director to conduct a second election,
-- despite the fact that the Board had found no error in the direction of
the first election.
At this point, the union, which had not been a party to the Florida
litigation, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia to enjoin the second election and to compel the Board to
certify the results of the first election. The union's theory was that since
the Board had found no defect in the original election, it was under a
87. See NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.67 (1965).
88. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Boire, 209 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
89. The basis for the employer's challenge to the merits of the direction of election
had been that it permitted economic strikers to vote despite the fact that the Board had
adopted no formal regulations governing voting eligibility. The Board's practice of ruling
on the voting eligibility of strikers in its adjudicative process (see W. Wilton Wood, Inc.,
127 N.L.R.B. 1675 (1960); Tampa Sand & Material Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1961)) was
claimed by the employer to be violative of that portion of § 9(c)(3) which provides that
'Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be
eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this Act in any election conducted within twelve months after the
commencement of the strike." Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch,
322 F.2d 993, 995 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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duty to certify the results of that election by virtue of section 9(c) (1),
which provides that if the Board finds that a question of representation
exists, "it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the
results thereof." The district court, applying Kyne standards, as they
had previously been articulated by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, denied the relief requested on the ground that the union
had not shown that the Board had violated a mandatory provision of the
act or that it deprived the union of due process of law. Rather, it found
that the Board's actions were an exercise of its broad discretionary authority under the act and therefore not subject to district court review.
The court of appeals reversed. Initially, the court noted the Board's
reasons for refusing to certify the results of the first election:
...[T]he Board concedes its reason for refusing to certify the
early election to be its serious doubt of the validity of its own
procedures, specifically its use of the single-member Board to
pass upon the Herald's request for review of the direction of
election. Having in mind the practical aspects of labor relations, the Board anticipated that the Herald would refuse to
bargain on the basis of the July election, on the ground that it
was invalid; that, upon subsequent judicial review of a probable
unfair labor practice charge, a court of appeals might uphold the
Herald's position; that a new election would then be ordered;
and that, as a result, labor relations would remain unsettled for
an extended period of time. To obviate this possibility, the
Board sought to hold a second election which would be free of
the possible infirmity of the first.9
But, the court held, these reasons were insufficient to warrant the
denial of an injunction. Although section 9(c) (1) is not mandatory in
all instances, and the Board is free to set aside elections that have been
unfairly conducted, because of employer or union action affecting employee free choice or a defect in the election machinery itself, which, for
example, improperly deprives an employee of his vote, there was here no
such unfairness. The only possible defect in the election procedure was
that only one Board member passed on the employer's request for review,
and that was cured by the subsequent three-member review. On these
facts, the court held that section 9(c) (1) does impose a mandatory
duty on the Board to certify the results of the election. Nor is it
relevant that section 9(c) (1) does not contain a negative prohibition of
the type involved in Kyne; a failure to comply with an affirmative com90. 322 F.2d at 996.
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mand is as much in excess of the Board's powers as a failure to comply
with a negative command. "A party would be as aggrieved by such a
failure as by an act of the Board contrary to an express prohibition.""
The court's conclusion that the rationale of Kyne applies when the
Board ignores an affirmative command to the same extent as when the
Board flouts a negative prohibition would seem unexceptionable. 2 Nonetheless, the decision is troublesome. For, once the court conceded that
the Board was under no obligation to certify the results of every election,
the only question before it was whether the Board had erroneously declined to certify the results of this election. For the court to decide that
question, it was necessary to review the Board's exercise of its concededly discretionary authority to determine under what circumstances
it will certify the results of an election. Nor was this a case such as Kyne
in which the Board failed to provide any reason for its failure to comply
with a statutory command. To the contrary, the court had conceded
that the statutory direction to certify election results was subject to
certain exceptions, and the Board had come forward with a rational basis
for declining to certify in this case-that a certification would surely be
challenged by the employer through the refusal to bargain procedure,
that it would probably be set aside, and that labor relations would be
unsettled for a lesser period of time were the Board, under these circumstances, to decline to certify the results of the challenged first election. It is thus arguable that in ordering the Board to certify the election
results, despite its argument for not doing so, the District of Columbia
Circuit, contrary to its previously developed principles, set aside a decision
made by the Board in the exercise of its discretionary authority under
section 9, simply because the court believed that the Board, on the facts
before it, had abused that discretion.
Were Miami Pressmen's broadly construed to permit district courts
to review the Board's exercise of its discretionary authority to decline to
certify representation elections regarded by the Board as invalid, it would
open a substantial hole in the wall keeping district courts from passing on
the wisdom or lack of it of Board decisions. However, the case is capable
of a narrower reading. Thus, as the court noted, there was no conduct
by the employer or the union that in the Board's view affected the results
of the election. Nor were there any defects in Board procedure that the
Board claimed might affect the results of the election. Thus, the decision may be read as announcing a rule of law-that the Board has no
discretion under any circumstances to decline to certify the results of
91. Id. at 997.
92. Cox, supra note 52, at 444. But see National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 65
L.R.R.M. 2065, 2067 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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what it concedes to be a fairly conducted election. So to hold is not to
review a Board determination as to whether or not the election was fairly
conducted, a review that would go significantly beyond Kyne, but rather
to interpret section 9(b)(1) as requiring certification in a particular
category of cases-those in which the Board has found no conduct which,
in its own view, would tend to affect the results of the election. 3
As so read, Miami Pressmen's does not go as far beyond prior decisions interpreting Kyne as a first reading might suggest. It is, however,
inconsistent with prior decisions in one respect-it finds district court
jurisdiction to enjoin a Board election order where there was no clear
violation of a plain statutory command. There is nothing on the face of
section 9 that deprives the Board of power to decline to certify the results
even of a concededly "fair" election when it determines that the overall
objectives of the act will be furthered thereby, nor is there anything in
the legislative history of the act that deprives the Board of this power.
True, there is nothing on the face of the statute or in the legislative
history which affirmatively vests the Board with power to refuse to certify
a "fair" election, but at least prior to Miami Pressmen'sthat had not been
decisive." Thus, Miami Pressmen's suggests that under some circumstances at least, the courts will go beyond enforcing those congressional
commands that are plain either on the face of the statute or in its legislative history. On the other hand, it would be wrong to view the case as
indicating a trend towards a more liberal standard of review in the
District of Columbia Circuit. For, at least to this point, that court has
interpreted Miami Pressmen's as an example of "flat disregard of [a]
statutory requirement"9' ' 5 rather than as justifying a more searching examination of Board representation decisions challenged in the district
courts. 96
Another case in which a court of appeals held that a district court
had jurisdiction to enjoin a Board election despite the absence of any
plain violation of a statutory command was Empresa Hondurena de
Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod.17 In that case, the Board's order directing
an election aboard a Honduran-flag vessel was challenged by the shipowner in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Although the district court declined to issue an injunction," the Second
93. See Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.Supp. 391 (D.D.C. 1966).
94. See, e.g., Leedom v. Norwich Printing Union, 275 F.2d 628, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Local 1545, Carpenters Union v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960); McLeod v. Local
476, United Bhd. of Indus. Workers, 288 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1961).
95. Local 130, IUEW v. McCulloch, 345 F.2d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
96. Ibid. See also Lawrence Typographical Union v. NLRB, 349 F.2d 704 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
97. 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962).
98. 200 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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Circuit reversed. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, conceded that
the Board's action had not denied constitutional rights, nor had the
Board acted in plain contravention of a specific mandate of the act.
Nonetheless, he stated:
However, the failure of the complaint to come within either
of the categories of actions to enjoin representation orders
that have heretofore been sustained is not fatal; the book
has not been closed for all time. Leedom v. Kyne, supra, must
be taken to have determined that, whatever may be the case with
respect to orders of the National Mediation Board as to bargaining units, . . . representation orders of the NLRB have not

been vested with complete immunity from injunction, either
by inferences from the National Labor Relations Act or on
the principle of Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation,
303 U.S. 41 (1938). Once that step has been taken, the courts
must make up their minds, as best they can, whether in a particular type of case Congress would or would not have wished
them to intervene against "agency action taken in excess of
delegated powers," 358 U.S. at 190. The considerations as
to delay from judicial intervention, persuasively marshalled in
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent for Mr. Justice Frankfurter
and himself in Leedom v. Kyne, supra, at 191-196, argue for
a negative answer in the usual case, having purely domestic
significance, where the Board is alleged to have acted wrongly,
although not plainly so; hence we gave such an answer in the
Local 1545 case and in McLeod v. Local 476, 288 F.2d 198
(2 Cir. 1961), as the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has done in numerous cases cited in the Local 1545
opinion. An altogether different situation is presented when, as
here, there is a substantial claim that the Board is exceeding
its jurisdiction in the field of foreign relations and is thereby
offending a friendly foreign government; we cannot believe
Congress would have wished to limit the role of the courts in
that situation to cases where the Board had violated a "clear
statutory command," . . . as against a command not so clear

8

a

While it is difficult to criticize Judge Friendly's conclusion that the
Board's incursion into the field of foreign relations made prompt judicial
review eminently desirable, his suggestion that the courts must determine
the availability of injunctive relief untrammelled by the narrow Kyne
standards theretofore delineated opens up disturbing prospects of judicial
98a. 300 F.2d at 228-29.
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delay (if not an increase in injunctions issued), if the district courts are
to be free to resolve, on a case-by-case basis, whether "Congress would
or would not have wished them to interfere against 'agency action taken
in excess of delegated powers.'" It is possible, however, to read Judge
Friendly's opinion in Empresa not as recommending a case-by-case determination, in which the extent to which the Board erred would be
weighed against the dangers of extensive district court review, but rather
as suggesting that in a particular type of case-that in which international
considerations are involved-prompt district court review is warranted.
Indeed, it was essentially on this basis-that the Board's decision had
international ramifications-that the Supreme Court sustained the exercise of district court jurisdiction to review the Board's decision in
Emnpresa. The court explicitly stated that its decision was not to be
understood as an enlargement of the Kyne exception,' and it has not
been treated as such by the lower courts. Rather, McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras.. has been read as creating a third
exception to the general rule of non-reviewability-an "international
ramifications" exception to go along with the "constitutional rights"
exception of Fay v. Douds and the "plain statutory violations" exception
of Leedom v. Kyne.
The final court of appeals decision sustaining a district court injunction subsequent to Kyne, and the most significant of the three, in
terms of its ultimate result, was Greyhound Corp. v. Boire.0 2 In
Greyhound, the union filed a petition with the Board requesting an election
among certain maintenance employees working at Greyhound bus terminals in four Florida cities. The employees in question were nominally
employed by Floors, Inc., a corporation engaged in the business of providing cleaning and maintenance services. Greyhound and Floors contended, in a hearing before the Board, that Greyhound was not the em99. Technically the Supreme Court did not review the decision of the Second Circuit
in Empresa, but rather a decision of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia granting an injunction against the election in a suit brought by the Honduran
labor union representing Empresa's employees. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), affirming 201 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 1962). The
Court's choice of Sociedad as the vehicle for adjudication on the merits made it unnecessary
to consider jurisdictional objections peculiar to the Empresa litigation. Thus, Empresa was
not decided by the Court, but was vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss.
Although the Board did not challenge the jurisdiction of the district court in Sociedad, the
Court examined that question sua sponte and resolved it on grounds equally applicable to
Empresa, i.e., that the international aspects of the Board's decision warranted prompt judicial review.
100. 372 U.S. at 17.
101. 372 U.S. 10 (1963). See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d
625, 627 (3d Cir. 1965); Potter v. Castle Constr. Co., 355 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 1966);
Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 64 L.R.RM. 2662 (9th Cir. 1967).
102. 309 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S, 473 (1964).
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ployer of the employees in question, but that Floors was, and thus that
the appropriate bargaining unit was either all Floors' employees in the
four cities in which the terminals were located or all Floors' employees
in each of the cities in separate groupings. The Board, however, found
that Floors and Greyhound were joint employers of the employees in
question and directed an election in the unit requested by the union.
Shortly before the election was to take place, Greyhound filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
seeking to enjoin the election. The district court, after hearing, granted
an injunction. The court held that the Board's factual findings were,
as a matter of law, insufficient to create a joint employer relationship with
respect to the employees involved; that those findings established as a
matter of law that Floors was the sole employer; and that the Board
had acted in excess of its delegated power in directing a representation
election where no employment relationship existed between the employees
and the purported employer.
The court of appeals affirmed, per curiam, but the Supreme Court
reversed. After noting the legislative history, which established that
Board representation proceedings are normally not subject to direct review in the courts, the Court stated that its decisions had recognized
only two exceptions to the general rule of non-reviewability, "each characterized by extraordinary circumstances." '
The first exception was
Kyne, the second Sociedad. Greyhound made no claim that its case
fell within the Sociedad exception, and the Court held it did not fall
within the Kyne exception.
The reasons Greyhound did not fall within the Kyne exception were
twofold.

First, the lower court had "misconceive [d] . . . the import

of the substantive federal law . . ."0' by viewing the independent contractor relationship of Floors to Greyhound as dispositive of the question
whether Floors' employees were, for purposes of the NLRA, employees
of Greyhound. The latter question turned on the relationship between
Greyhound and the employees involved, not the relationship between
Greyhound and Floors.'0 5 Second, and more important for our purposes,
the district court had misconceived the "painstakingly delineated procedural boundaries of Kyne." Thus the Court stated:
[W]hether Greyhound possessed sufficient indicia of control
to be an "employer" is essentially a factual issue, unlike the
question in Kyne, which depended solely upon construction of
the statute. The Kyne exception is a narrow one, not to be ex103. 376 U.S. at 479-80.
104. Id. at 481.
105. Ibid.

DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF NLRB
tended to permit plenary District Court review of Board orders
in certification proceedings whenever it can be said that an erroneous assessment of the particular facts before the Board has
led it to a conclusion which does not comport with the law.
Judicial review in such a situation has been limited by Congress
to the Court of Appeals, and then only under the conditions explicitly laid down in § 9(d) of the Act."0 6
The Court's separation of the lower court's substantive error from
its procedural one is, of course, highly significant. For it indicates that
even if the Board was wrong on the "employer" status of Greyhound,
the district court nonetheless was without power, under Kyne, to set
aside the Board's decision. The reason, as the Court stated in Greyhound, is that Kyne does not permit "plenary District Court review of
Board orders in certification proceedings whenever it can be said that
an erroneous assessment of the particular facts before the Board has
led it to a conclusion which does not impart with the law." And, in
determining the importance of Greyhound, it is important to note what
type of "factual" issue was involved in that case. It was not a factual
issue that turned on a disagreement as to what the facts were. That
is, the district court had not disagreed with the Board's findings of fact
as to the relationship between Greyhound, Floors, and the employees.
Rather, the district court had held that on those findings, the Board could
not, as a matter of law, conclude that Greyhound was an employer
for purposes of collective bargaining. Thus what was really involved
in Greyhound was a decision by the district court, on essentially undisputed facts, that the Board had misapplied a statutory standard and had
erroneously determined the circumstances under which an employeremployee relationship may exist under the act. Stated differently, what
Greyhound presented was a so-called mixed question of law and fact
involving the application of a generally formulated statutory standard to
the particular facts of the case.
Once it is recognized that the issue in Greyhound was not a "pure"
factual issue, but rather involved the alleged misapplication of a statutory
standard to essentially undisputed facts, the significance of that decision
is apparent. The great majority of contested Board decisions under
section 9 involve precisely such issues-when does a question of representation exist, what is a unit appropriate for bargaining, who is an
employee, when was an election validly conducted, etc. If such decisions
are removed from the purview of district court review, along with the
106. Id. at 481-82.
107. But see National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 65 L.R.R.M. 2065 (S.D.N.Y. March

30, 1967).
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"pure" questions of fact, the range of issues on which the Board can
be challenged before the district courts is extremely narrow. That is,
apart from those cases which contain international ramifications, a problem not likely to arise again after the Board's defeat in Empresa, and
those cases presenting constitutional questions, the only question open to
a district court today would appear to be whether, wholly apart from
the facts of the case before it, and solely as a matter of pure statutory
construction, the Board has acted "in excess of its delegated powers
and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act."'0 8 In other words,
once it is determined that a party seeking to obtain district court review
of a Board representation decision is raising an essentially factual issue,
as that term was used in Greyhound, i.e., to include the application of
general statutory standards to particular undisputed facts, injunctive
relief should be denied and the complaint should be dismissed. 9
There is, of course, nothing startling about the view that district
courts, under Kyne, are without power to set aside a Board decision
solely because the Board may have erred in its application of a general
statutory term to the particular facts before it. This is essentially the
view which the courts of appeals, especially the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, have enunciated in a series of cases since Kyne, albeit
phrased slightly differently, i.e., that a district court lacks jurisdiction to
set aside a Board decision made in the exercise of the Board's discretionary powers. Greyhound simply sharpens the test of those cases and
makes it plain, in terms of those cases, that a failure to apply a statutory
term properly on the facts of a particular case is within the area of the
Board's discretion.
The Availability and Timing of District Court Review to a Plaintiff
Who Has Access to the Statutory Revied Procedure
Employers. One element leading to the Court's conclusion in Kyne
that the district court had jurisdiction to review the Board's decision
was that, in the absence of such jurisdiction, the plaintiff union would
have been without judicial protection against the Board's unlawful action.
The Court stated that "absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts
would mean 'a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress has
given professional employees, for there is no other means within their
108. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958).
109. See Potter v. Castle Constr. Co., 355 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1966); Ertel Mfg. Co.
v. Little, 59 L.R.R.M. 2937 (S.D. Ind. July 13, 1965); Vergeer v. McCulloch, 56 L.R.R.M.
2635 (D. Ore. May 20, 1964). The fact that an issue of "pure" statutory construction is
raised does not, however, mean that injunctive relief should be granted. What it does mean
is that the problem presented is one which the court may consider on the merits. Injunctive relief is available only "where the fact of a statutory violation cannot seriously be
argued." Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 23 (5th Cir. 1965); see also
Local 130, IUEW v. McCulloch, 345 F.2d 90, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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control... to protect and enforce that right' and that 'this Court cannot
lightly infer that Congress does not intend judicial protection of rights
it confers against agency action taken in excess of delegated powers.' "110
This raises the question whether the existence of an opportunity for
judicial protection of statutory rights under the review provisions of
the NLRA would render inapplicable the Kyne exception to the general
lack of district court jurisdiction to review Board representation proceedings. In other words, may a plaintiff who could obtain review of
his claims through section 10 of the act successfully invoke the protection of a district court against a Board decision otherwise meeting the
Kyne standards, i.e., a decision plainly inconsistent with a mandatory
provision of the NLRA? This question arises most frequently in district
court suits by employers so it will be first considered in that context.
Initially, it is clear that an employer who believes that the Board has
erred at some point in the representation proceedings does have a procedure, under the statute, for challenging the Board's action. As pointed
out previously section 9(d) provides that when a representation determination forms the basis of a Board unfair labor practice order, and
that order is before a court of appeals for review under sections 10(e)
or (f), the record in the representation case shall be filed in the court
of appeals and the representation determination may be reviewed at that
time. Thus, an employer who wishes to contest a Board election decision
may allow the election to proceed, and, if the participating union receives
a majority of the votes cast and is certified by the Board as the representative of his employees, refuse to bargain on the ground that the underlying
election was beyond the Board's power. Such a refusal would undoubtedly trigger a section 8 (a) (5) unfair labor practice charge, followed
by a Board decision finding an unfair labor practice and ordering the
employer to bargain. Review of the Board's bargaining order, and of
the election on which it was based, could then be obtained in the court of
appeals under sections 10(e) or (f). In short, an employer has available
a statutory procedure for full judicial review of Board election proceedings prior to his being placed under any enforceable obligation based
on the election.
The availability to employers of section 10 judicial review of Board
representation proceedings, coupled with the legislative history indicating
Congress' intent to confine employer litigation to that route,1 1' would
appear to provide strong arguments against extending to employers the
district court review procedure made available to unions by Kyne. Thus,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which fashioned the
110. 358 U.S. at 190.
111. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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Kyne exception, has repeatedly turned back employer challenges to Board
representation decisions without consideration of their merits, simply
calling attention to the fact that the plaintiff employer had available a
statutory review procedure. 112 Indeed, the court explicitly stated, albeit
in dictum, that "the Leedom v. Kyne remedy was not devised for the
benefit of an employer.")

113

Despite the foregoing, by far the greater number of district court
4
suits seeking to obtain review under Kyne are brought by employers."
Additionally, the Second Circuit, in Empresa,"5 indicated an unwillingness to accept the argument that the availability of statutory review to an
employer is an absolute bar to district court review. Finally, the Fifth
6
Circuit, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Boire," explicitly rejected
Hence the question of employer access to the district
this argument.11
courts would appear to be both "live" and significant.
The Second Circuit's decision in Empresa, which permitted the employer plaintiff to obtain district court review of the Board's election
decision in preference to the more circuitous route of triggering a reviewable unfair labor practice order by refusing to bargain, rested partially8
on the international ramifications of the Board's action in that case."1
The court also sought, however, to justify its holding on more conventional grounds. Thus, the Second Circuit noted, "the possibility of the
plaintiff's precipitating an unfair labor practice charge was present in
112. See General Cable Corp. v. Leedom, 278 F.2d 237, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Atlas
Life Ins. Co v. Leedom, 284 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Norris v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 26
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
113. Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993, 997
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
114. Of the 67 reported cases since Kyne in which district court review of Board
representation decisions has been sought, 43 were filed by employers, 20 by unions, and
4 by employees. While the reported cases are but a fraction of the total suits filed (see 29,
30 NLRB ANN. REP. table 21 (1964, 1965), there is no reason to suppose they are not
representative.
115. 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962).
116. 343 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1965).
117. The only other court of appeals decision that has plainly rejected the contention
that employer resort to the district courts is wholly precluded was Greyhound Corp. v.
Boire, 309 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), rev'd, 376 U.S. 473 (1964). In all other suits
reaching the courts of appeals, relief was denied the employer on the ground he had failed
to show that the Board had violated a plain statutory command. Surprenant Mfg. Co. v.
Alpert, 318 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1963); Consolidated Edison Co. v. McLeod, 302 F.2d 354
(2d Cir. 1962); Rock-Hills Uris v. McLeod, 344 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1965); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1966); Potter v. Castle Constr. Co., 355 F.2d
212 (5th Cir. 1966); American Metal Prods. Co. v. Reynolds, 332 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1964);
Urethane Corp. v. Kennedy, 322 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964); Waers v. Sprecher Drilling
Corp., 329 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1964); Leedom v. Fitch Sanatarium, Inc., 294 F.2d 251
(D.C. Cir. 1961); Kingsport Press, Inc. v. McCulloch, 336 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied,
379 U.S. 931 (1964).
118. "If action ordered by the Board would trench on the jurisdiction of a foreign
government contrary to the will of Congress, the best time to stop it is before the offense
occurs, not somewhere along the line." 300 F.2d at 229.
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Kyne itself; yet the Court evidently did not deem this fatal.""' 9
Whatever the merit of the "international ramifications" aspect of
Empresa, an aspect peculiar to that case, the latter argument is hardly
persuasive. True, the plaintiff union in Kyne could have refused to
bargain for the non-professional employees, but, as the court of appeals
opinion in that case pointed out, the likelihood that such a refusal would
provoke an unfair labor practice charge by either the employer or the
non-professionals was minimal. The employer would have no reason to
file a charge, since he would be quite content to deal with the nonprofessionals individually; the non-professionals would be reluctant to
file a charge since the outcome, if the charge were sustained, would be
to place their fate in the hands of a reluctant bargaining agent. 2 '
On the other hand, a certified union will almost invariably institute
unfair labor practice proceedings against an employer who refuses to
bargain with it. In the first place, unions are in the business of bargaining. If an employer refuses to bargain with a certified union, the union
must take steps to compel bargaining or forfeit its very raison d'etre.
Filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board sets in motion, at
no cost to the union, machinery that will, if the Board's order is sustained, lead to a court order directing the employer to bargain. Additionally, if the union wishes to call a strike to compel the employer to bargain,
a successful unfair labor practice charge will protect the strikers against
losing their jobs to replacement at the conclusion of the strike."2 Accordingly, the employer who refuses to bargain with a certified union
because of an asserted defect in the Board's election decision is, as a
practical matter, assured of obtaining judcial review of that decision.'
Thus, to say that the bare possibility of union access to the statutory
review procedure in Kyne was not fatal to the union's ability to obtain
district court review is hardly to say that the employer's assured access
should be equally irrelevant to his ability to obtain such review. To the
contrary, the difference in degree of access to the statutory route is so
119. Ibid.
120. 249 F.2d 490, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
121. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
122. See NLRB v. Air Control Prods., Inc., 335 F.2d 245, 247 n.1 (5th Cir. 1964).
The only potential disadvantage to the union in filing § 8(a) (5) charges would be that if
those charges were ultimately rejected by a reviewing court, the union would presumably
be in the same position as an uncertified union (since its certification had been declared
invalid) and subject to the limitations on picketing imposed on an uncertified union by
§ 8(b)(7) of the act. As a practical matter, however, the only burden imposed by
§ 8(b) (7) in this situation would be that the union, which had already won one election,
would be forced to go to another election, which it would have to win, in order to continue picketing. Balancing this potential disadvantage of filing § 8(a) (5) charges against
the potential advantages-a bargaining order and guaranteed reinstatement for strikersthere would be few occasions in which a union would be unlikely to file the § 8(a) (5)
charges.
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different as to make the two situations wholly distinguishable.12

The only other court of appeals decision explicitly rejecting the argument that Kyne is inapplicable to employer suits because of the availability
of the statutory review procedure was Miami Herald. Initially, the
Fifth Circuit made the point, already discussed in the context of Empresa,
that the union in Kyne had won the election, and hence could theoretically
obtain judicial review of the Board's decision by refusing to bargain for
the non-professionals. The court then noted that the employer's ability
to obtain judicial review under the statute depends on the occurrence of
at least two contingencies: (1) the union must decide to file an unfair
labor practice charge, and (2) the Board must sustain the charge and
petition for enforcement of its order. The first of these contingencies,
as has been pointed out, is close to a certainty. The second is equally
certain. The employer who refuses to bargain with a certified union need
have no fear but that the General Counsel will issue a complaint predicated
on the union's charge or that the Board will find his refusal to bargain an
unfair labor practice and order him to bargain.12 4 And, in the unlikely
event that the Board would not seek judicial enforcement of its bargaining
order, the employer could initiate judicial review proceedings under
section 10(f).
The next argument made by the court in support of its conclusion
that the statutory review procedure did not exclude the possibility of
district court review was that the statutory route "places a manifest hardship on the employer, for he must run the risk of incurring a meritorious
unfair labor practice charge in order to challenge the validity of the
election."' 2 5 The court did not spell out the precise nature of the "hardship" involved in incurring a meritorious unfair labor practice charge,
but from a footnote reference to the fact situation in Miami Herald,2 '
123. One comment on Kyne, pointing to the Court's statement that the professional
employees there had no means "within their control" (358 U.S. at 190) to protect their
rights, other than a suit in the district court, suggested that the employer, too, should
have access to the district court, since he has no means within his control to protect himself
from an erroneous Board decision. Thus, the argument goes, the employer's ability to
obtain review is dependent on the filing of charges by the union with which he refuses
to bargain and is not "within [his] control." Note, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73
HARv. L. REv. 84, 219-20 (1959). This argument, while technically accurate, ignores the
spirit of Kyne-that district court review was available because the absence of jurisdiction
would mean "'a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress' [had] given professional employees .. " (358 U.S. at 190). So long as absence of district court jurisdiction
would not mean a sacrifice of congressionally-created rights, as it quite plainly would not
in the case of the employer with his easy access to the courts of appeals through the refusal
to bargain route, it is difficult to see why the technicality of how the employer gets to the
court of appeals-through a charge filed by him or by a union-should be significant.
124. See note 3 supra.
125. 343 F.2d 17, 22 (5th Cir. 1965).
126. Id. at 22 n.10.
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it appears to have had in mind the employer's obligation, under the
NLRA, to reinstate employees who strike in protest against a refusal to
bargain that is ultimately found to constitute an unfair labor practice.'
It would not seem, however, that district court review should be available
for the purpose of enabling the employer to avoid the application of a
rule of law that is designed, inter alia, to discourage unjustified refusals
to bargain by protecting employees who strike in protest against such
a refusal.
The Fifth Circuit itself appears to have found the "manifest hardship" argument less than conclusive, for immediately after setting it out, it
stated: "However, it must be assumed that Congress was aware of
these obstacles to a challenge of election procedures and that it intentionally made it difficult for the employer to challenge election procedures
in order to insure that frivolous complaints were not utilized to bring
The foregoing asabout a postponement of collective bargaining."' 2
sumption is sound, as the legislative history shows, but the use of it
here leaves the court with little in the way of an articulated basis for
rejecting the Board's argument that district court review is barred to an
employer. Nor does the court set out any further analytical basis for
its conclusion. Rather, it concludes by stating simply that the Supreme
Court did not make the distinction (between suits by employers and
those by unions) in either Sociedad or Greyhound, "which were both
suits instituted by an employer."' 2
While the court of appeals was wrong in asserting that Sociedad was
an employer-instituted suit, 3 ' Greyhound was such a suit. And, although
the Board had argued in its brief in Greyhound that the lower court's
decision should have been reversed on the grounds, inter alia, that the
Kyne exception was inapplicable to employers,' 3 the Supreme Court did
not go off on those grounds, but on the essentially factual nature of the
employer's challenge. 3 2 One inference that can be drawn from the Supreme Court's failure to decide Greyhound on the grounds that the employer's statutory review procedure precluded resort to the district court is
that the Court has rejected that distinction. Indeed, that was the inference
drawn by the Fifth Circuit in Miami Herald. Another possible inference
is that since the Court found no violation of a specific statutory command
such as would warrant the grant of injunctive relief under Kyne, it simply
did not reach the question considered here-whether Kyne applies to
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
343 F.2d at 22.
Ibid.
See note 99 supra.
Brief for the NLRB, pp. 23-28.
See text accompanying note 106 supra.
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employer suits. Neither inference is compelling and in view of the
arguments against applying Kyne to employer suits, one would hope that
the lower courts would not read the Supreme Court's silence as resolving
the question, but as leaving it open for future resolution.
If the question of employer access to the district courts is to be
regarded as still open after Greyhound, one argument yet to be considered
in favor of permitting such access is that the statutory procedure, which
cannot be invoked until after election and certification, provides no protection against the harmful effects of the election itself. That is, even
if the employer is ultimately successful in defending against a section
8(a) (5) charge, he will have had to undergo the expense and turmoil of
the election. 1 33 Additionally, an election in which a union is shown to
possess majority status will arguably encourage the union to utilize the
strike weapon against an employer who chooses to follow the statutory
review procedure rather than grant recognition. A court of appeals decision a year or two after the election holding that it was invalid will not
relieve the employer of the expenses incurred in going through the election or defending against a strike caused by a union victory in the election.13 Finally, ,the argument continues, to permit a district court to
grant injunctive relief when the employer shows Kyne standards to
have been violated involves no serious danger of unwarranted delay, with
which Congress was concerned in its general preclusion of pre-election
review of Board representation proceedings, since the granting of injunctive relief under Kyne is limited to the situation in which the Board's
error is plain. In sum, an employer might argue, the potential injury
in being compelled to undergo an unwarranted election is sufficiently
great, and the likelihood of unjustified delay sufficiently small, that
Congress would not wish to preclude injunctive relief against an election
found to fall within the Kyne standards for the granting of injunctive
relief.
The foregoing argument is not without appeal. On the other hand,
no matter how the standard is formulated for the grant of injunctive relief, some district courts will err, injunctions will be improperly issued,
and unjustified delay in the resolution of questions of representation will
occur. Indeed, of the reported cases since Kyne in which injunctive relief was granted at the behest of an employer, and in which the court applied Kyne standards as it understood them, a substantial number have
133. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625, 627 (3d Cir. 1966).
134. In this context the employer could also argue that as compared to the union in
Kyne he is injured even if no unfair labor practice charge is filed, since the injury of which
he complains is not limited to that of having to bargain on the basis of an invalid election.
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been reversed on appeal.135 Additionally, so long as pre-election review
is available, some employers will resort to it for purely tactical purposes,
i.e., not with the expectation of ultimately prevailing in the litigation, but
solely to delay the holding of an election that they fear will result, if held
on schedule, in a union victory. Thus the crucial question is whether
the harm to an employer that may result from requiring him to follow
the statutory route, with its lack of protection against the injury that
may flow from an improperly directed election, is sufficient, when balanced
against the possibility of unwarranted delay in the conduct of valid elections, to justify pre-election review in the district courts even under
Kyne standards.
In response to this question, the extent of the employer's injury
in being compelled to undergo an election that ultimately is found to
have been improperly directed is surely relevant. One respect in which
the employer may claim to be injured, i.e., the expenses flowing from an
unwarranted election, appears on examination to be of little substance.
For, to the extent the employer's claim is based upon the decreased
efficiency of operations flowing from the election campaign itself, the
campaign is usually just about over by the time the suit to enjoin the
election is brought. Thus, while there are normally some 30 days between the direction of election and the scheduled election date," 6 most
suits challenging representation elections are not filed until a week or two
prior to the election.' 3 7 Additionally, the fact of an employer suit to
enjoin the election is likely to intensify employee interest, with a resultant
drop in efficiency, rather than to diminish that interest. Finally, the
few minutes necessary to permit an employee to cast his ballot, even if
on working time rather than before or after working hours, hardly
seems a substantial economic burden on the employer.'83
Nor, on examination, can one say that the likelihood of strike action
135. The only exceptions have been Empresa, Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McCulloch,
50 L.R.R.M. 2041 (D.D.C. 1962) a case similar to Empresa which was not appealed, and
Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C. 1966), in which no appeal was taken.
An appeal is pending in Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Johnston, 60 L.R.R.M. 2060
(M.D.N.C. 1965). Cases in which the grant of an injunction by a district court was reversed on appeal are Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samofi, Greyhound Corp. v. Boire,
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Boire, Potter v. Castle Constr. Co., Waers v. Sprecher
Drilling Co., and Leedom v. Fitch Sanatarium (all cited in note 117 supra).
136. See, e.g., M. V. Dominator, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (64 L.R.R.M. 1215) (Feb. 13,
1967); E. I. Dupont de Nemours, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (64 L.R.R.M. 1021) (Dec. 30,
1966).

137. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625, 626 (3d Cir.
1966); Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 224 (2d Cir. 1962);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Boire, 209 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
138. Indeed, it is the Board's practice, at least in the Chicago area, to arrange voting
times to permit all employees to vote on non-working time unless the employer consents
to employees taking time off from work to vote. Conversation between the author and
Martin M. Schneid, Assistant to the Regional Director, 13th Region, NLRB, April 10, 1967.
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is significantly enhanced by proof of majority status flowing from a
Board election. To the contrary, the experience under Public Resolution
44, which provided for pre-election review, as compared to that under
the statutory review procedure, indicates that the likelihood of strikes
is greater if resolution of the underlying representation question is delayed by district court suits than if the representation proceeding is
allowed to run its course. 139 In sum, the potential economic injury to
an employer flowing from a representation election that may turn out to
have been wrongfully directed would not appear sufficiently great to
justify the risks of unwarranted delay flowing from an improper grant
of injunctive relief, even as limited by narrow Kyne standards. 140
One situation in which the employer's claim to pre-election review
may be somewhat stronger is where the Board has set aside one election
as invalid and directed another election shortly thereafter. For, it may
be argued, whatever the strength of an employer's interest in being free
of the disruption and expense of one election, section 9(c)(3), which
prohibits the Board from holding more than one valid election in a
twelve-month period, provides explicit evidence of Congress' intent to
protect an employer from the burden of two elections within a twelvemonth period, at least where the first election was valid.'M Such protection cannot be effectuated by judicial review of a refusal to bargain
charge after the second election; even if the employer prevails he will
have had to undergo the second election. Thus, it may be argued that
pre-election district court review of a Board order directing a second election within twelve months of the first should be available.
On the other hand, Congress' primary concern in passing section
9(c) (3) appears to have been to prevent the Board from repeatedly
directing elections in a situation in which employees rejected unionization,
not to protect the employer from the occasional case in which the Board
directed a second election in the erroneous belief that the first was in139. Compare H.R. REP. No. 972 (on S. 1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935), 2
HIST. NLRA 2960-61, quoted in text accompanying note 14 supra, with Hearings on
S. 1000, 1264, 1392, 1550, 1580 and 2123 Bejore the Senate Committee on Education
LEG.

and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 462-63 (1939). Nor might a district court enjoin a strike
to compel an employer to recognize a union precluded from demonstrating its alleged majority status by virtue of an injunction against a Board election. Both the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 u.s.c. § 104 (1964) (cf. United States v. Building & Constr.
Trades Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1941) (per curiam), affirming 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.
1941)), and the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB over peaceful strikes (see Garner v.
Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953); cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)) would preclude such an injunction.
140. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625, 628 (3d Cir. 1965);
Norris, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 26, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
141. Section 9(c) (3) provides: "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit
or any subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election
shall have been held."
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valid. 4 The employer's interest in being free of an erroneously directed
second election is no greater than his interest in being free of an erroneously directed first election, and absent explicit evidence to the contrary,
not present in the legislative history of section 9(c) (3), it should not
district
be assumed that Congress was willing to permit pre-election
43
court review in the former situation, but not in the latter.Y
If the potential injury flowing from an improperly directed election
is insufficient to justify pre-election district court review at an employer's
behest, post-election review would appear barred a fortiori. Whatever
injury may be thought to flow from the bare fact of -the election having
been held is complete. The only question at this point is whether the
election has imposed a legally binding obligation on the employer, i.e.,
whether he must bargain with the winning union. This question can be
promptly resolved through the statutory review procedure. Indeed, if
speedy review of the underlying election is what the employer desires,
he may stipulate his case directly to the Board and be assured of a
reviewable order to bargain within a few months from the date of
his refusal to bargain. 144 Furthermore, review through the statutory
procedure insures the union involved that if the underlying election was
properly conducted, the Board's bargaining order will be enforced, placing
the employer under a judicial decree compelling him to bargain. If, on
the other hand, the employer has obtained review in the district court,
a judicial determination that the election was properly conducted will
result solely in the dismissal of his complaint, placing him under no
bargaining obligation until the Board proceedings, which may have been
stayed by the district court pending its decision, or deferred by the Board
out of deference to the district court,' 45 are completed. In sum, postelection district court review advances no legitimate employer interest,
since if the Board's election order was invalid, prompt statutory review
is available. And, if the election order was valid, district court review
served only to delay the issuance of a bargaining order and the commencement of collective bargaining. 46
142. S. REP. No. 105 (on S. 1126), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 25 (1947), 1 LEG. Hisr.
LMRA 418, 431; 93

CoNG. REc.

3954 (daily ed. April 23, 1947), 2

LEG.

HisT. LMRA 1013

(remarks of Senator Taft); 93 CONG. REc. 7683 (daily ed. June 23, 1947), 2 LEG. Hisr.
LMRA 1639 (remarks of Senator Ball).

143. Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625, 628-29 (3d Cir.
1965).
144. See, e.g., American Mfg. Co., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (64 L.R.R.M. 1127) (Jan.
19, 1967).
145. See Uyeda v. Brooks, 348 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1965).
146. It has been suggested that post-election review in a district court at the behest
of an employer adds little to the delay involved in the commencement of bargaining since
it merely substitutes review in the district court and the court of appeals for review before
the Board and the court of appeals. Note, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HAuv. L.
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One argument sometimes made in favor of permitting an employer
to challenge the Board's election proceedings without awaiting a reviewable bargaining order is that such an order may provide the basis for a
judicial compulsion of bargaining absent full-scale review of the validity
of the underlying election. Thus, the Board on occasion proceeds under
section 10(j) to obtain injunctive relief compelling an employer who
challenges the validity of the Board's certification to bargain with the
certified union pending the conclusion of unfair labor practice proceedings
before the Board. 4 7 In such section 10(j) proceedings, the court does
not normally resolve the merits of the employer's challenge to the underlying certification, but decides only whether there is reasonable cause to
believe that the employer's refusal to bargain was an unfair labor practice and whether injunctive relief would be just and proper. 4 s Hence
an employer might, under section 10(j), be required to bargain with a
union ultimately found to have been improperly certified. 1 49 It is argued
that in order for an employer to protect himself against the irreparable
injury of being compelled to bargain with an improperly certified union,
he must be able to obtain district court review of the certification prior to
the commencement of unfair labor practice proceedings before the Board.
REv. 84, 218-19 (1959). This view rests, however, on the explicit assumption that an employer who is unsuccessful in the non-statutory review procedings will commence bargaining absent an enforceable order directing him to do so, rather than insist on further review
under the statute in which the result is presumably pre-ordained. There are two reasons
why this assumption is not always sound. In the first place, the different standard of review applicable to a district court action and a statutory review action means that an employer who does not prevail in the former may yet prevail in the latter. See Boire v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1965); International Ass'n of Tool
Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d 514, 516 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960).
Furthermore, if the employer's objective in seeking district court review is to delay the
commencement of bargaining, defeat in the district court litigation will not be likely to
deter him from refusing to bargain until ordered to do so, an order that will be forthcoming only at the termination of the statutory review proceedings. For whatever reason,
employer resort to both statutory and non-statutory review procedures is not uncommon.
See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Boire, 309 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1962), and NLRB v. Greyhound Corp., 368 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Leedom, 284 F.2d 231
(D.C. Cir. 1960), and Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB 295 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962); Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco, 323 F.2d 477 (6th Cir.
1963), and Eastern Greyhound Lines v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1964); Cross Co. v.
Leedom, 271 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1959), and Cross Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.
1961); Checker Cab Co. v. Roumell (E.D. Mich. 1963) (unreported), and NLRB v.
Checker Cab Co., 367 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1966).
147. See Meter v. Western Iowa Pork Co., 63 L.R.R.M. 2503 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 1,
1966); LeBus v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. La. 1963);
Greene v. David Buttrick Co., No. 65-153-W (D. Mass. March 15, 1965) (unreported).
148. LeBus v. Manning, Maxwell &Moore, Inc., supra note 147, at 705; see also Douds
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 103, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), afl'd, 241
F.2d 278, 285 (2 Cir. 1957). But see McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.
1966), vacated and remanded, 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
149. See Greene v. David Buttrick, Inc., No. 65-153-W (D. Mass. March 15, 1965) (unreported), and NLRB v. David Buttrick, Inc., 361 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1966).
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The short answer to this argument is that an employer against whom
the Board seeks section 10(j) relief compelling him to bargain with a
certified union prior to review on the merits in the court of appeals may
arguably have a legitimate claim that the Board is acting contrary to
Congress' intent, at least in those cases in which the refusal to bargain
is not accompanied by independent unfair labor practices. 5 This should
not, however, mean that every employer, including those against whom
section 10(j) relief is not sought, is free to bypass the statutory review
procedure in favor of direct review in the district courts. Indeed, in
view of the relative infrequency with which the Board seeks section
10(j) relief against an employer whose refusal to bargain is predicated
on the alleged invalidity of the underlying certification, it is almost
frivolous to argue that the risk of being compelled to bargain without
full judicial review of the validity of the Board's certification if the
Board seeks section 10(j) relief justifies an employer in obtaining district
court review immediately on the issuance of a certification. Finally,
while the asserted reason for seeking district court review would be to
obtain full judicial review prior to coming under an obligation to bargain,
rather than the truncated section 10(j) review, the standards of review
in the district court proceedings, would, under Kyne, appear to be even
less searching than these in a section 10(j) proceeding. Hence, the
possibility that the Board will seek a section 10(j) injunction compelling
an employer to bargain with a certified union prior to completion of the
statutory review proceedings furnishes no substantial justification for a
district court to entertain an employer's suit to enjoin or set aside the
certification.
To summarize, while the narrow bases on which district court review is available to any plaintiff after Greyhound makes the problem of
5
employer suits somewhat less pressing than it was prior to that case,1 1
the better rule would appear to be that employers, who have a congressionally-prescribed and reasonably adequate statutory procedure for obtaining judicial review of NLRB representation proceedings, should not
be free to invoke district court jurisdiction for that purpose. Or, at very
150. See S. Rn'. No. 573 (on S. 1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935), 2 LEG. HiSr.
NLRA 2314, quoted in text accompanying note 15 supra. See also Greene v. David Buttrick Co., supra note 149, denying § 10(j) relief as not "just and proper" where the employer's refusal to bargain was predicated solely on its desire to obtain judicial review,
through the statutory procedure, of the Board's certification. But see Meter v. Western
Iowa Pork Co., 63 L.R.R.M. 2503 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 1, 1966); LeBus v. Manning, Maxwell &
Moore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 702 (W.D La. 1963).
151. But see Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C. 1966); Greensboro
Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Johnston, 60 L.R.R.M. 2060 (M.D.N.C. 1965); Potter v. Castle Constr.
Co., 355 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1966); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625
(3d Cir. 1966), in all of which injunctive relief was granted by a district court at the
behest of employer plaintiffs subsequent to Greyhound.
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least, district court review should be limited to those cases, such as
Empresa, in which there are interests involved (such as the maintenance
of good relations between the United States and another nation) that
might not be adequately protected by statutory review after election and
certification. 152
Unions. Assuming that the availability of the statutory review procedure to an employer should bar employer recourse to the district courts,
the next question is whether union access to the statutory review procedure should also serve as a bar. In Kyne this problem did not have
to be decided since, as a practical matter, the plaintiff union had no access to the statutory review procedure. Nor, at the time Kyne was decided, was a union likely, under any circumstances, to have such access
to the statutory review procedure as would warrant a denial of district
court review, at least on the grounds that an alternative review procedure
existed under the statute. For, while the union plaintiff in Kyne had won
the election which it sought to contest, and so could at least theoretically
have triggered a reviewable refusal-to-bargain charge against itself, the
normal situation in which a union would wish to challenge a Board election proceeding would be that in which the union had lost (or was likely
to lose) the election. A union that had lost an election could not, of
course, obtain review of that election by refusing to bargain, since it
would not have been certified as a bargaining representative and would
be under no statutory duty to bargain.
The only method even theoretically open to a losing union to obtain review under the statutory procedure at the time Kyne was decided
was to induce or encourage a work stoppage among the employees involved for the purpose of compelling the employer to grant recognition
to it. For, if another union had been certified as the representative of
those employees (but only in that situation), the union's conduct would
If such
subject it to a charge of having violated section 8(b) (4) (C). 5
a charge had been filed, the union could defend before the Board on the
152. Another class of cases in which employers should perhaps be free to invoke district court jurisdiction is that in which the employer seeks to compel the Board to assert
jurisdiction over his business. In this situation, the employer cannot invoke the statutory
review procedure, so that, absent district court review, he is without any means to enforce
such rights as he may have under the NLRA. Compare Leedom v. Fitch Sanatarium,
Inc., 294 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1961), examining (albeit dismissing) a suit of this nature
under Kyne standards, with General Cable Corp. v. Leedom, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir.
1960), and Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Leedom, 284 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1960), dismissing employer suits on the sole ground that there existed an alternative review procedure under
the act.
153. Section 8(b) (4) (C) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to induce work
stoppage to compel an employer to bargain with it as the representative of certain employees "if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such em-

ployees under the provisions of section 9."
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ground that the underlying certification was invalid. Should the Board
overrule that contention and issue a cease and desist order, that order
together with the underlying certification would appear subject to review
in the court of appeals under section 9(d) .'5
It would have been an extremely risky procedure, however, for a
union to seek review in this manner. For, if it were not to prevail in its
contention that the underlying certification was invalid, it would have
been liable under section 303 (a) (3) for any damages found to have
resulted from its picketing. Nor could one discount this risk as equivalent to the risk of being found to have committed a violation of section
8(a) (5) which an employer must run in order to obtain review under
the statutory procedure. For, in contrast to the monetary penalties imposed for a violation of section 303 (a) (3), the employer who is found
to have violated section 8(a) (5) is subject only to the issuance of an
order directing him to bargain. Furthermore, while an employer's refusal
to bargain might possibly trigger a strike, with its attendant financial
loss to all parties, the union could not obtain review, if at all, except
by triggering a strike. In short, at the time Kyne was decided there
was no adequate statutory procedure for review of Board representation
decisions to which a union could be remitted as an alternative to district
court review.
Subsequent to the Court's decision in Kyne, however, Congress
added section 8(b) (7) to the Act. Under section 8(b) (7) (B), a union
that has lost a representation election, whether or not another union was
certified, violates the act if it pickets for recognition within twelve months
of a "valid" election. The question whether the election was valid may
be raised in the statutory review of a Board decision finding the union
Nor is a union liable in damages
to have violated section 8(b) (7) (B).'
for having violated section 8(b) (7) (B). Thus, a union that believes
the Board to have erred in proceedings under section 9 now has available
to it a practicable method of challenging the Board's action under the
statutory review procedure. This presents the question whether a union
seeking to obtain district court review of representation proceedings
should be remitted to the statutory route.
Initially, there is no evidence that Congress intended, when it passed
section 8(b) (7), to modify or overrule Kyne by providing a method
under the statute whereby unions may obtain judicial review of Board
154. But cf. Parks v. Atlanta Printing Union, 243 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 937 (1957); Tungsten Mining Corp. v. District 50, UMW, 242 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.),
cert denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957); Meat Drivers Union, 115 N.L.R.B. 890, 891-92, 900-01
(1956).
155. NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters Union, 314 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1963).
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representation decisions. This need not be conclusive of the problem,
however. If a court Were to find that compulsory resort to the statutory
review procedure, by way of section 8(b) (7), would further a general
congressional intent in favor of restricting judicial review to the statutory
procedure, where available, it would presumably be free to require resort
to that procedure. Alternatively, since the relief sought in district court
suits challenging representation proceedings is invariably equitable in
nature, a court that found the statutory review procedure to be adequate
might decline to review a Board representation decision on the ground
that equity will not intervene where there exists an adequate remedy at
law.

15 6

On the merits of the question, however, it is unlikely that the courts
would find it appropriate to require a union to resort to provoking section
8(b) (7) charges against itself as a means to obtain judicial review of
Board representation decisions. The advantage of limiting unions to
this procedure would be that all litigation challenging representation proceedings would be deferred until after the election. The use of this procedure avoids the temptation to use pre-election litigation as a tactical
device to delay the election until a more favorable time for the plaintiff
and advances the goal of prompt resolution of representation questions.
On the other hand, a section 8(b) (7) charge must be predicated on
either picketing or a threat of picketing. If the employer were satisfied
with the outcome of the election (as, for example, he might be if his
employees chose no union or one of two or more competing unions with
which he preferred to deal), a mere threat of picketing would probably
be insufficient to induce him to file a section 8(b) (7) charge. Thus,
as a practical matter, a union might have to engage in picketing with a
significant economic impact before the employer would file a section
8(b) (7) charge. It would hardly seem in the best interests of employers,
unions, or the general public to force an economic confrontation of this
nature solely as a means to regulate the timing of a union's challenge to
a Board election. Furthermore, it would be wholly inconsistent with
Congress' purpose in enacting section 8(b) (7)-to limit recognitional
picketing-to hold that one effect of that enactment was to require a
union to engage in recognitional picketing in order to secure judicial
review which it could previously have obtained by wholly peaceful means.
156. Cf. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Leedom, 284 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
157. Although occasional decisions since the passage of § 8(b)(7) have noted the
opportunity which that section provides for statutory review of Board representation decisions, no court has yet suggested that this opportunity precludes a union from seeking re-

view in a district court. See Local 130, IUEW v. McCulloch, 345 F.2d 90, 95 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
965). But cf. Lawrence Typographical Union v. McCulloch, 349 F.2d 704, 708 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Livingston v. McLeod, 209 F. Supp. 606, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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Hence, it is not likely that the possibility of statutory review made available by the passage of section 8(b) (7) will be held to preclude union resort
to the district courts as a means to challenge Board representation decisions.
Assuming that the availability of statutory review through provoking
a section 8(b) (7) charge is not a sufficient basis on which to bar union
access to the district courts, the next question is whether the advantage
of the section 8(b) (7) route-precluding pre-election litigation for the
purpose or with the effect of delaying an election-might not be achieved
simply by permitting only post-election suits. The argument against
precluding district court review prior to an election, from the union viewpoint, would be that the election itself may injure it in a way that cannot
be undone by a subsequent order setting aside that election. Thus, a
union might argue, an election defeat may cause irreparable injury to
its standing among the employees involved or among other employees
Additionally, if there were more than
whom it is trying to organize.'
one union participating in the election, and the employer were to commence bargaining with the victorious union while the loser were challenging the election in the district court, the loser might, even if ultimately successful in overturning the election, find itself at a substantial
disadvantage in a subsequent election.' 59
The task of striking a balance between these conflicting interests
is not an easy one. Nor has much light been shed on the problem by
litigation since Kyne. 60 Suits brought by unions to enjoin Board elections have generally been resolved on the merits without discussion of
whether the plaintiff union should be required to await the outcome of
the election prior to challenging the Board's decision.'' Although the
failure to consider this argument, uniformly raised by the Board, may
indicate that it has been rejected sub silentio, the fact that few injunctions
against elections have been granted at the district court level, so that
cases coming to the courts of appeals have not generally required a consideration of the propriety of pre-election relief, makes this inference something less than compelling. In fact, there are only three reported cases
158. See, e.g., Livingston v. McLeod, supra note 157.
159. Cf. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). It is unlikely that
a district court would have jurisdiction to enjoin collective bargaining between the employer and the successful union. See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953);
Amazon Cotton Mills v. Textile Workers, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948); cf. San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Taylor v. Bean, 49 L.R.R.M.
3056 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1962).
160. In Kyne itself the union waited to sue until after the election had been completed and a certification issued. Thus, the question whether pre-election litigation was
permissible was not presented.
161. See, e.g., Milk Drivers Union v. McCulloch, 306 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
McLeod v. Local 476, United Bhd. of Industrial Workers, 288 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1961).
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since Kyne in which injunctive relief has been granted against the conduct of an election at the behest of a union: Norwich Printing Union v.
Leedom,'62 in which the district court's grant of injunctive relief against
an election was reversed on the merits by the court of appeals; Local 1545,
Carpenters Union v. Vincent, 6 ' in which the court of appeals granted a
stay of election pending appeal, but later noted, in dismissing the union's
suit on the merits, that it might be better to require a union to await the
election and the certification of another union before challenging the
Board's decision,"' and Sociedad,'65 in which the international ramifications of the Board's decision provided a compelling basis for prompt
resolution of the union's claim. Thus, there would not appear to exist
any articulated judicial consensus as to whether a union's interest in
protecting itself from such injury as may flow from an election itself
outweighs the interest in speedy resolution of questions of representation.
One resolution of these conflicting interests that has from time to
to time been adopted by a court faced with a union suit to enjoin an
election is to permit the election to take place, but to order the Board to
impound the ballots, uncounted, until the court shall have passed on the
merits of the union's claim.' 66 If the court decides that the union's claim
is well-founded, the Board may subsequently be permanently enjoined
from counting the ballots ;.6 if it decides in the Board's favor, the Board
is free to count the ballots and certify the results. 6 The effect of this
procedure is to prevent a union from utilizing district court litigation as a
means to delay the conduct of the election until a time more favorable to
it. At the same time the union is protected against any harm that might
be thought to flow from an improperly directed election. Impounding
would thus seem a sensible resolution of conflicting interests, and one
that should be considered by any district court faced with a substantial
162. 45 L.R.R.M. 2589 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1959), rev'd, 275 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1960).

163. 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960).

164. Id. at 132 n.7. But cf. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300

F.2d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 1962).
165. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
166. See, e.g., Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d
993, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1963); IBEW v. Leedom, 44 L.R.R.M. 2754 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1959),
rev'd on other grounds, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Local 719, Int'l Prod. Union v.
McLeod, 183 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Livingston v. McLeod, 209 F. Supp. 606
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Machinery Chauffeurs v. Madden, 57 L.R.R.M. 2284 (N. D. Ill. Sept. 15,
1964), afl'd, 343 F2d 497-(7th Cir. 1965). Impounding has also been ordered in response
to employer efforts to enjoin representation elections. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Boire, 209 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Reeves v. Phillips, 206 F. Supp. 847 (N.D.
Ga. 1962); U.S. Pillow Corp. v. McLeod, 208 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
167. Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union, supra note 166; IBEW v. Leedom, supra note 166.
168. Local 719, Int'l Prod. Union v. McLeod, 183 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1960);
Livingston v. McLeod, 209 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Machinery Chauffeurs v. Madden, 57 L.R.R.M. 2284 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1964), afl'd, 343 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1965).
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claim by a union that a scheduled Board election should be enjoined as
unlawful.
Employees. While the vast majority of district court actions to review Board representation proceedings are instigated either by employers
or labor organizations, an occasional suit is brought by one or more employees. 69 Such suits have, without exception, been brought by employees
whose interests in the particular case were the same as those of the employer involved. In other words, in each of these cases, the employeeplaintiffs have been opposed to representation by the union seeking
collective bargaining rights. Thus, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion
that at least one reason for the litigation having been instituted by employees, rather than the employer, was to avoid the limitations on an
employer's freedom to obtain district court review that flow from the
availability to him of a statutory review procedure. For, it is plain,
employees have no statutory method whereby to obtain review of repre0
sentation decisions.

7

A court "not anxious to open the back door to a litigant denied the
front door, or to open any door to 'subterfuges for hampering and delaying a final determination of a bargaining representative,' ,"1' accordingly might dismiss a suit brought by employees whose interests are the
same as those of their employer on the ground that those interests can
be fully protected by the employer through the refusal to bargain route.
Furthermore, if the employees wish independent representation of their
interests, they are free to seek intervention in the unfair labor practice
proceedings that will follow the employer's refusal to bargain. 72 On
the other hand, absent evidence that the employee-plaintiffs are merely
169. See Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F2d 326 (6th Cir. 1966); DePratter v. Farmer, 232

F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Hughes v. Gatreu, 64 L.R.R.M. 2678 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 1967);

LaPlant v. McCulloch, 58 L.R.RM. 2835 (D.NJ. March 29, 1965); Vergeer v. McCulloch,
56 L.R.RM. 2635 (D. Ore. May 20, 1964).

170. H.R. REP. No. 245 (on H.R. 3020), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947), 1 LEG. HisT.

LMRA 334 (set out in text accompanying note 23 supra). Since unions normally have no
access to the statutory review procedure either, there is no tactical advantage to having
suits which would further union interests brought by individual employees. Perhaps as
a result of this, there are no reported cases in which individual employees whose interests
coincided with those of the union brought suit to challenge a Board representation decision. Occasional suits by union officials, proceeding in both their individual and official
capacities, have been treated by all parties as brought on behalf of the union. See, e.g.,
the Kyne case.

171. Shoreline Enterprises v. NLRB, 262 F.2d 933, 943 (5th Cir. 1959).
172. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.65(b) (1965). See Gary Steel
Prods. Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1160 n.1 (1963); Shoreline Enterprises, 117 N.L.R.B. 1619, 1624
(1957). But see Goodall Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 814, 817-18 n. 6 (1949). As intervenors before
the Board, the employees would have standing, as persons aggrieved by a final order of
the Board, to seek judicial review under § 10(f). See Shoreline Enterprises v. NLRB,
supra note 171, at 936; LaPlant v. McCulloch, 58 L.R.R.M. 2835, 2836 (D.N.J. March 29,
1965).
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"fronting" for the employer, it would seem harsh to deny them review in
the district courts solely because their interests coincide with those of the
employer and the employer might trigger unfair labor practice proceedings in which the employees could intervene. 7 3 For, if the employer
were not to refuse to bargain, the employees would have no judicial review
at all, however erroneous the Board's decision and however seriously it
may have affected their interests.
Perhaps the most satisfactory resolution of this problem is for the
district court to entertain an employee-instituted suit without regard to
the fact that the employee interests involved are the same as those of the
employer, but only on condition that the employer has not refused to
bargain with the union. If he has, the suit should be suspended, or dismissed without prejudice, while the employees seek to intervene in the
unfair labor practice proceedings that will undoubtedly follow (or may
already have followed) the employer's refusal to bargain. If intervention
is granted, the employees will have full opportunity to assert their rights,
both in proceedings before the Board and in any subsequent proceedings
for judicial review of the Board's order directing the employer to bargain
with the certified union. In the unlikely event intervention were denied,
the court could proceed to hear the employees' claims if it were persuaded
that the employees' interests might not be adequately protected by the
employer in the unfair labor practice proceedings.
This procedure, if followed by the district courts, would both insure
full protection of employee rights and discourage employers from instigating employee suits to advance the interests of the employer. For,
knowing that the price of guaranteed employee access to the district court
was employer waiver of the refusal to bargain route, the employer would
presumably prefer the more searching review available under the statutory
procedure. Hence, any employee suits would be likely to be bona fide,
and should be entertained and decided on Kyne standards, except to the
extent the employees were allowed to intervene in a pending unfair labor
practice proceeding." 4
One further point should be made in this analysis of employee suits
to-challenge Board representation proceedings. Employees who are opposed to union representation would appear to have no significant interest
173. Cf. Shoreline Enterprises v. NLRB, supra note 172, at 943.
174. Cases in which employee-plaintiffs were denied district court review, at least

in part because of the possibility of statutory review through intervention in Board proceedings, include LaPlant v. McCulloch, supra note 173, and Vergeer v. McCulloch, 56
L.R.R.M. 2635 (D. Ore. May 20, 1964). The pendency of unfair labor practice proceedings against the employer as a means of obtaining judicial review of asserted Board errors
was also noted in Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 1966). Cf. Potter v. Castle
Constr. Co., 355 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1966).
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in preventing the Board from holding an election, but only in preventing
certification as the result of an invalid election. Hence, employee suits
should not be entertained under any circumstance until after election and
certification, if any, of a bargaining representative. 175
175. Vergeer v. McCulloch, supra note 174.

